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ABSTRACT 
As a society we have devoted much resources and effort to understand the different dimensions 
of housing and its effects on human life. The concern of housing as an important keystone of 
social life dates back to the very initial stages of the Neolithic revolution where nomads turned 
into sedentary tribes because they understood the importance of having a shelter, not only 
because it was the best way preserve life, but also because it provided social status and sense of 
belonging (Kerbo, 1999). Even in those times, housing was a defining factor when understanding 
differences in wellbeing among tribes. Today it is certainly true that we keep seeking the 
satisfaction of those very basic housing needs, and we keep facing similar challenges when 
comparing the access to housing across the different sectors of our society. Additionally, today 
we also face a modern world full of changes and complexities that have been translated the way 
we do research to explain the role of housing in our economic and social life.  
 Inspired by this changing nature, I have explored how our understanding about certain 
housing issues changes depending on the context. In particular, I present three essays that 
provide a new perspective of well known housing issues such as the role of attributes on the 
demand for housing, the estimation of housing price indices, and the revealed preferences on 
residential mobility and location choice. In these three essays I provide new evidence by 
applying well-established methods to a different spatio-cultural context, more spatial-
disaggregated units, and specific constrained situations respectively. All together, the evidence 
presented here highlights how our understanding of the aforementioned housing issues changes 
contingent to the current context. 
 In chapter one, I estimate the demand for housing attributes using the case of Chile –a 
developing economy in South America. This chapter provides evidence about the role housing 
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attributes play on the demand for housing, highlighting that Housing Size and Housing Location 
are basic necessities contrary to Housing Quality and Housing Features that are considered as 
luxury goods when exploring the effects of income changes on the demand for these housing 
attributes. Along chapter one I argue that this information is key in a country where the reduction 
of income inequality is a priority on the political agenda, because those attributes revealed as 
necessities should be prioritized when designing subsidies. I also argue that this study is not only 
relevant for the case of Chile, but for other developing economies that have seen Chile as a 
example to follow when designing their own housing policies. Agreeing with this last claim, the 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy provided financial support pursuing this research, for which I 
am thankful. This research is now on the stage of getting approval to be submitted for 
publication. 
 Chapter two contributes with evidence that argues for a closer look when tracking 
housing prices. In particular, I argue against currently used methodologies estimating housing 
price indices, which assume that having a single price index for the biggest metropolitan area is a 
sufficient indicator to make judgments of the housing market behavior at higher aggregation 
spatial units such as states or cities. In contrast to this notion, this chapter applies the 
methodology originally proposed by (McMillen, 2012)  to the case of 10 Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) in the state of Illinois, showing that although the biggest housing market in a state 
is in depression there could be others that are flourishing within the same state. This finding 
challenges the way we understood the leader-follower economic relationship between big and 
small metropolitan areas respectively. Additionally, this paper provides an alternative and more 
accurate way to track housing prices in small spatial units. When comparing the proposed price 
index with the traditional mean-based index, significant differences arise due to the fact that the 
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latter do not control for changes in housing characteristics as the index I propose index does. 
Finally and to show the full extent of this methodology, an additional section will be added 
including the estimations of the proposed housing price index at the community level for the city 
of Chicago. Same as in the case between MSAs in Illinois, the results are expected to challenge 
the assumption of a single price index for the city as a whole, showing the natural variation in 
housing prices across the different housing markets within the city. 
Chapter 3 analyzes residential mobility and location choice within the framework of the 
increasingly recurrent urban renewal phenomenon. Although neither residential mobility nor 
urban renewal processes are new issues, I claim that there is a literature gap regarding the 
analysis of the potential outcomes of households under displacement conditions.  This study 
takes advantage of data purchased from InfoUSA on address changes of residents in Champaign 
County to be able to identify residential mobility from one period to another. Along with 
individual-level variables defining financial and demographic situation of a household and its 
members, we use housing and neighborhood characteristics to conduct our analysis. After 
conducting exploratory analysis on the data, the proposed method contemplates first estimating a 
discrete choice model of residential mobility and location choice on the sample as a whole 
capturing the dynamics and mobility patterns in normal conditions. Later and based on this 
model, we estimate the potential outcomes using the data on those households to be displaced, 
hence obtaining their potential outcomes in terms of location choices, access to job centers, and 
social services. Finally we re-estimate the model on other similar displacement situations to 
evaluate the accuracy of our predictions on a situation that has already occurred. All together, 
this paper contributes with a powerful evaluation tool for potential outcomes due to housing 
displacement in a context of urban renewal.  
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 Combined, these three essays highlight that our current social and economic conditions 
could either challenge our previous believes about the housing market, or pose new levels of 
complexity demanding more specific analysis than we previously ignored or assumed 
unnecessary.  
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CHAPTER 1: TOWARDS HOUSING POLICIES THAT CONSIDER HOUSING 
PREFERECES: ESTIMATING THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING ATTRIBUTES IN CHILE1 
Abstract: 
Understanding household preferences for housing attributes is imperative for developing 
countries after years of housing policies that failed mostly due to the mismatch between 
housing solutions and needs. This paper provides income and price elasticity estimates of the 
demand for housing attributes as an indicator to measure how households perceive housing 
attributes (necessities or luxuries). These metrics are important because they allow evaluating 
previously national-level housing policies as well as suggesting new paths of action that are in 
accordance to households’ preferences. The study focuses on Chile because its influential role 
in designing housing policies in other developing countries (Gilbert, 2002). Using five cross-
section household surveys from 2000-2011, our results suggest that Size and Location are 
perceived as basic necessities. Contrarily, Quality and Housing Features are considered luxury 
goods. Size and Location are more price-inelastic than other attributes. These results are 
consistent across regions, and suggest that households prefer larger and better-located houses. 
																																																								
1 Co-authored with Dusan Paredes, Department of Economics, Universidad Católica del Norte, Chile. This 
research was partially financed by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy  
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1.1. Introduction 
While Chile has established a reputation as a country with a consistent reduction in the 
housing deficit over the last twenty-years, it has lately been highlighted as a country with an 
alarming lack of quality in the provision of public housing (Chamorro, 2013). Direct aid has 
been the principle channel in solving housing needs i.e. construction and purchase subsidies, 
rather than indirect interest rate subsidies, but deficient standards have raised concerns in the 
public sector not only regarding how to improve quality but also in understanding which are 
those attributes that consumers value the most in housing and how they might interact to 
improve the consumer welfare of housing policy beneficiaries (Follain & Jimenez, 1985) .  
The lack of information regarding the economic valuation of housing attributes can be 
addressed by estimating a demand model that allows the calculation of price and income 
elasticities of said attributes. These estimations are crucial inputs when it comes to designing 
future housing programs (Greene & De Dios Ortúzar, 2002). For example, price elasticities 
reveal how sensitive households are in their demand to changes in the price of housing 
attributes and hence whether they are perceived as either substitutes or complementary goods.	
This helps us to understand the level at which each attribute’s demand will contract or expand 
to changes in their own price as well to fluctuations in other goods. Specifically, price 
elasticities might reveal that the quantity demanded of housing location is highly sensitive in 
itself (i.e. significant changes in demand in response to small variations in the price of housing 
location), as well as the degree to which households will be willing to trade the consumption 
of other housing attributes to maintain their consumption of housing location. Second, income 
elasticities provide a measure of the sensitivity of consumers’ demand to income changes, 
which allows the classification of housing attributes as needs or luxuries. This is a key 
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measure in a country where the reduction of income inequality is a priority on the political 
agenda since those attributes (revealed as necessities) should be prioritized when designing 
subsidies as opposed to those revealed as luxuries. These two measures offer a clear picture of 
how consumers demand housing attributes, which then enables us to align policy accordingly. 
In addition to the importance that estimating the demand of housing attributes and their 
elasticities has in itself, we argue that Chile’s particular geographic conditions require the use 
of a regional approach in the estimation of demand. Considering that Chile covers 4,270km 
(2653mi) from north to south, it is expected that Chile’s regional divisions also represent 
different geographic, climatic, and economic contexts within particular housing markets. 
Chile has desert in the north, is mediterranean-like in the center and has rainforest and sub-
polar forest in the mid-south and extreme southern regions. We suspect that these climatic and 
geographic differences are translated into consumer preferences for housing attributes that are 
spatially heterogeneous. For example, southern regions require a higher quality of walls and 
roofs in order to face hard winters, while northern regions’ absolute lack of rain hardly 
requires anything similar. To test our hypothesis about the potential spatial heterogeneity, we 
include in the demand system socio-demographic and local amenity components that allow us 
to differentiate the elasticity by both consumer characteristics and local-regional preferences. 
We estimate a two-step procedure using cross-section household data from 2000, 
2003, 2006, 2009 and 2011 in order to identify the demand system for housing attributes in 
Chile. Following Garcia & Raya (2011), we group housing characteristics in four broad 
dimensions: Housing Size (number of bathrooms, bedrooms, size), Housing Quality (floor, 
wall and roof quality), Housing Features (water heater, washer, refrigerator, landline and 
computer) and Housing Location (approximated from other available variables). In the first 
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step, we estimate a hedonic function using a log-linear model in which empirical issues such 
as the inclusion of household characteristics and the demand for housing features are 
addressed. The second step estimates an Almost Ideal Demand System for Housing Attributes 
(AIDS-HA hereafter) in order to calculate income and price elasticities. We incorporate a 
third stage in order to estimate confidence intervals for the calculated elasticities using 
bootstrapping so that we might evaluate regional differences.  
Our results can be summarized in three main findings. First, Housing Size and 
Housing Location are considered normal goods or basic necessities as opposed to Housing 
Quality and Housing Features, which are classified as luxuries. Second, own-price elasticities 
suggest that Housing Size and Housing Location are more inelastic than Housing Quality and 
Housing Features. This implies that the consumption of these two goods would not decrease 
as much as it would for the other goods if prices change.  Third, our estimations provide 
partially significant evidence to support spatial heterogeneity in the demand for housing, only 
partly accepting our hypothesis regarding their existence. In this paper we argue that these 
results are important evidence that should be considered by policy makers when evaluating 
current housing programs and when designing future public housing options. 
The section that follows reviews how the context of Chile’s current housing policy has 
evolved accordingly to the economic development of the country into one that focuses on the 
need for more profound and detailed information regarding consumer preferences. We argue 
that this results from the need to formulate housing policy that is in accordance with Chile’s 
current economic growth levels as well as its OECD peers. We then discuss the theoretical 
approaches for the estimation of a demand system for housing attributes, pointing out the 
contribution of this paper to the current literature. Sections 4 and 5 present the economic 
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model and the empirical methodology, respectively. Subsequently, the data is presented and 
the remaining sections explain the results followed by the main conclusions. 
 
1.2. Housing Policy in Chile  
As in most Latin American countries, Chile’s housing policy has transitioned through 
different mechanisms designed regarding the country’s different stages of economic 
development. According to Chamorro (2013) Chile has passed through three clearly 
differentiated phases of housing policy. The first phase began in 1905 and it was created with 
the intention of reducing sanitary and health problems associated with the illegal construction 
of housing in the peripheries of large cities. The project was entirely government funded and 
according to Law 1838, the state created the Housing Council (Consejo Habitacional in 
Spanish), in order to provide housing services to the poorest population of the country. The 
main features of this policy were: 1) it was integrally provided and funded by the government 
and the consumer did not play any role in financing it, and 2) the policy inevitably pursued a 
high number of housing projects but with very low costs and quality standards due to the high 
expenditure pledged by the government. Neither characteristic took into consideration how 
housing characteristics are valued by consumers or the type that would improve their welfare 
level. Moreover, the existence of economics of scale implied that characterizing the demand 
for housing attributes was not a relevant factor for most of these projects since they were built 
using similar architectural designs and were erected in cities’ peripheral areas with precarious 
access to amenities and transportation systems.  
By 1965, the policy was highly criticized due to its poor performance in achieving its 
proposed goals. According to MINVU (2004) between 1906 and 1925 the government built 
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around 400 houses. The policy was hardly sustainable in the long run due to the excessive 
government expenditure. This resulted in a housing policy with a low quality of services as 
well as significant hurdles in introducing new projects.  
The second phase of housing policy took place between 1965 and 2010 during which 
it was modified towards a subsidiary system that contemplated households that would 
partially contribute to financing the projects. The government developed a new institution 
called Housing Corporation (Corporación Habitacional), which was managed by the first 
Housing Ministry (Law 16.391). The role of this entity was to design the best way for 
assigning housing projects to low-income households. This effort was the first to generate an 
improvement in housing quality, which required a system of revealed preferences in order to 
calculate consumers’ monetary contribution towards financing their housing. However, there 
is no record of these estimations. 
Although this complementary approach between the government and households 
generated clear improvements in the structural characteristics of housing, it still had serious 
weaknesses. The policy was the first demand subsidy in Latin America (Rubio, 2006): the 
savings generated by households as their contribution were added to the public subsidies, 
which the private sector received in order to construct the homes. The main problem with the 
new system was that the state provided full subsidies for the lowest income groups instead of 
incorporating a shared investing system. These groups revealed their economic situation 
through surveys generated by the government such as the Social Protection Survey (Ficha de 
Protección Social in Spanish), which contemplated fixed thresholds to determine access to 
housing subsidies. As a result, an initial problem of the policy was the creation of incentives 
for higher income households to be misclassified as poorer ones and hence to be included in 
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the housing programs which resulted in significant over financing by the government. Another 
problem was the abandonment of low-medium income families, as their income levels where 
either too high to be able to apply for a full subsidy, or too low to generate savings in order to 
apply to the dual financing plan. This group grew over time as well, highlighting a serious 
drawback to the system. 
This entire scenario resulted in low quality housing, a lack of competition in the housing 
market with serious losses in the bargaining power of households (Richards, 1995). Note also 
that the assignment of housing still lacks a sorting of the consumer preferences regarding 
housing attributes. In other words, households must choose a project with attributes defined 
by government standards and consequently, cannot select houses according to their 
preferences. Furthermore, and because of the government restriction to selling or renting 
subsidized housing, households had no access to the complete pool of existing houses in the 
market, which limited their access to labor markets (Soto & Torche, 2004).   
The third and final phase of housing policy started in 2010 when the Chilean government 
passed its most recent housing reform. According to Chamorro (2013) this last effort aims to 
increase self-selection. In other words, households now have an incentive to reveal their real 
purchasing power in order to improve the matching between demand and supply. Note that 
this program is strongly focused on revealing households’ preferences. There is, however, a 
problem. Empirical evidence regarding the attributes households are interested in and the 
economic relationships between them does not exist. According to Caldera Sánchez (2012) 
the current housing policy is a crucial factor in understanding the inequality and poverty of 
Chile. The current subsidy system is designed solely for ownership and thus it does not allow 
access to rented houses in which households’ preferences might be incorporated in the search 
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process. As it is points out in Caldera Sánchez (2012); “taxing housing so owing is not 
favored over renting would reduce distortions and make the tax system less regressive […]”,  
“enhancing the responsiveness of housing supply to demand would ensure there is a good 
match between housing construction and demand, and avoid that public support gets 
capitalized into housing prices.” (p. 2) 
1.3. Literature Review 
 The literature regarding the estimation of housing demand and its elasticities is clearly 
marked by a first wave of papers that use several specifications of demand systems based 
mostly on restrictive parametric assumptions. Pioneer articles in this first wave include  King 
(1976) and Mcmillan (1979) who propose a two-step procedure for the evaluation of housing 
as a bundle with distinct and recognizable attributes while providing evidence of different 
price and income elasticities. In this two-step approach, implicit prices for each attribute are 
estimated in a first round, and then used for the estimation of housing demand and other 
indicators in the second one.  
Even though King (1976) and Mcmillan (1979) recognize that the results of these two-
step approaches are strongly constrained by the quality of their data, the estimation of 
elasticities allows them to suggest that structural housing characteristics are both inferior and 
complementary commodities, as well as the existence of higher substitutability among 
housing attributes when comparing housing with other goods. Additionally, both articles 
highlight the relevance of the estimation of elasticities through demand systems. In this 
regard, Mcmillan (1979) states that “what has been successfully demonstrated, however, is 
that a household’s preferences for public type commodities can be revealed through systems 
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of equations models” (p. 187). In other words, the authors established the basis for the 
empirical estimation of housing demand systems. 
 In the line of two-step approaches, Awan et al. (1982) analyze how household 
characteristics and the location of household activities affect the demand for housing 
attributes. Using data for London, they point out space as the housing component with the 
highest relevance (i.e. a necessity), as opposed to Housing Quality, which shows a high-
income elasticity, specifically higher than one, and thus will be considered a luxury. 
Regrettably, the authors recognize that low quality data makes it impossible to perform 
additional analysis due to the lack of significance in the estimated coefficients as well as the 
restrictions imposed by the Linear Expenditure Demand System that was used. Lim et al. 
(1984) and Follain & Jimenez (1985)  proposed similar theoretical frameworks but with a 
special emphasis on willingness to pay (WTP) estimates. These articles found that a 
household WTP for space is less than the cost of providing it, which has evident policy 
implications. Regardless of the empirical focus, this first wave in the literature established the 
use of demand systems as the theoretical framework for the elasticity estimates.  
A second wave of articles has contributed to the discussion through the incorporation 
of flexible functional forms that fulfill the theoretical constraints in the consumer 
maximization problem. The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) (Deaton & Muellbauer, 
1980) has been very influential in the study of the demand for housing attributes. The turning 
point can be tracked to Parsons (1986)  who approached the estimation of housing demand by 
applying the AIDS to the context of respective attributes yielding the Almost Ideal Demand 
System for Housing Attributes (AIDS-HA). AIDS-HA is a flexible demand system with a 
closed functional form and well-defined microeconomic properties where homogeneity, 
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symmetry and adding-up are maintained in the hypothesis. In his application of seven US 
cities, Parsons found that the highest income elasticity (i.e. a luxury good) was for Housing 
Features, while the lowest was for Housing Quality (i.e. a necessity good). Regarding price 
effects, the highest elasticity was also for Housing Features and the lowest for Neighborhood 
Quality. Besides the clear and interesting application, the incorporation of the AIDS approach 
undoubtedly brought microeconomic consistency to this literature, giving us a rational 
framework for our analysis2. 
Following this line,  Cheshire & Sheppard (1998)  highlighted the importance of 
having functional forms theoretically grounded on a utility function. This work also 
incorporated theoretical constraints derived from the maximization utility problem. The 
authors estimate a linear version of the AIDS and find that income elasticities for the British 
housing market are somewhat larger than previous estimates for North American cities. 
Interestingly, they also evaluate their estimations along income levels and find significant 
differences between high and low income households. 
 Garcia & Raya (2011) is the most similar article to our own proposed research 
considering both the subject and contemporaneity. The authors use an AIDS-HA to carry out 
elasticity estimations for Barcelona, Spain. Following King (1976) and Parsons (1986), they 
cluster housing characteristics into three groups: Quantity, Quality and Location. Their results 
indicate that housing Location is very price-inelastic, suggesting that a consumer will sacrifice 
Quality and Quantity in order to maintain Location when prices increase.  
This paper contributes to this body literature in three areas. First, we establish a 
demand system for the representation of the spatial heterogeneity of preferences between 																																																								
2 We intentionally do not discuss other relevant papers such as Arimah (1992) and Pasha & Butt (1996)  due to 
the lack of microeconomic consistency in obtaining elasticity estimates. Even though they represent an 
interesting empirical exercise, we focus the revision on the AIDS approach. 
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housing markets within a country’s regional markets. While previous literature only 
performed estimation exercises at country or city level, our work is different in that we argue 
that considering a single market is unsustainable in light of Chile’s economic geography. This 
issue was also pointed out by Iturra Rivera & Paredes (2012), who estimate regional housing 
price indices for Chile using an AIDS. Even when the authors do not report elasticities, they 
show how economic geography can affect the stability of the demand system parameters. 
Second, most of the literature reports comparisons between elasticities without adding the 
corresponding statistical tests to evaluate whether these parameters are statistically different 
among housing attributes or spatial units. We overcome this point by offering confidence 
intervals for the estimated elasticities by bootstrapping. Third, in the context of the current 
body of literature, this is the first estimation of both the demand for housing attributes and the 
income and price elasticities for Chile.3 Besides the usefulness of these estimates for the 
country itself, evaluating Chile’s housing demand and its potential strengths and weaknesses 
is also important for other developing countries that have been using Chile as an example in 
setting their own housing policy (Gilbert, 2002). Regarding housing policy in Chile and its 
potential impact on other developing countries, we hope that our paper encourages the 
inclusion of spatial considerations and confidence intervals previously ignored in matters of 
housing policy. 
1.4. Economic Model 
As we specified in the previous sections, we use an economic model consisting of two 
steps. In the first, we obtain prices for each one of the housing attributes defining the housing 
bundle, for which we only have renting prices. Our model choice is based on the model of 																																																								
3 WTP estimates were provided for the Chilean context (Greene & De Dios Ortúzar, 2002). However, we believe 
that this paper falls outside the scope of this work due to their use of a discrete choice approach, their limited 
geographic focus (Metropolitan Region of Santiago only), as well as the absence of elasticity estimations.  
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hedonic prices suggested by Rosen (1974). In a second stage, we present the AIDS-HA as a 
flexible demand system that uses the hedonic prices obtained in the first stage for estimating 
income and price elasticities of housing attributes. Since both models have been widely 
discussed in the literature, we prefer to discuss only the core elements for each one here4.  
 The household is a representative economic agent that consumes a heterogeneous good 
called housing that is composed of attributes 𝑍 𝑧!, 𝑧!,… 𝑧! . Simultaneously, households also 
consume a composite good 𝑋 and preferences for both goods are represented by a well-
behaved utility function 𝑈 𝑍,𝑋 . This utility function is assumed to be weakly separable 
between housing attributes and the composite good. Households are price takers and they face 
a non-linear budget constraint 𝑌 = 𝑃 𝑍 + 𝑋  where the housing price is a function of 
attributes 𝑍, while the price for 𝑋 is normalized to the unity. Supply of housing attributes 
affects the hedonic price function, but it is assumed as an exogenous factor. 
The utility maximization subject to the constraint generates a demand function for 
each one of the 𝑛 housing attributes: 𝑧! = 𝑓 𝑝!!,𝑝!!,… ,𝑝!";𝑌       (1) 
where 𝑝! is the partial derivative of the hedonic price with respect to each one of the 𝑛 
elements of 𝑍. The demand functions for each 𝑧! must fill the theoretical constraints required 
by the neoclassical framework of utility maximization. To carry out these conditions, we 
specify an AIDS-HA. Assume a PIGLOG functional form for the expenditure function that 
can be expressed in the budget share form as follows: log 𝑒 𝑝!!,… ,𝑝!",𝑢 = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝!" + !! 𝛾!"∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝! + 𝑢𝛽! 𝑝!"!!!!!!       (2) 
																																																								
4 See Parsons (1986) for additional details 
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where subscripts 𝑗  and 𝑘  are the 𝑗!! and 𝑘!!  attributes; 𝛼,𝛽, 𝛾  are parameters that define 
preferences and 𝑝!  are the recovered hedonic prices. Using the Shepard Lemma, the 
expenditure function is differentiated to get the demand function 𝑧!, but in the budget-share 
form: 𝑤! = 𝛼! + 𝛾!"𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑜𝑔 !!!      (3) 𝐻 = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝! + 1 2 𝛾!"𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝!!!!    (4) 𝛾!" = 1 2 𝛾!"∗ + 𝛾!"∗      (5) 
where 𝑤! is the share of the total expenditure assigned to the housing attribute 𝑖, namely 𝑤! = 𝑝!"𝑧! 𝑥, and 𝑥 = 𝑝!"𝑧!!  is the total expenditure on housing attributes. Additionally, the 
demand system satisfies the necessary conditions such as adding up, homogeneity and Slutsky 
symmetry. Following Ray (2001) and Parsons (1986), we decide to include a demographic 
component to incorporate the heterogeneity of preferences of housing along with the 
distribution of households’ characteristics: 𝑤! = 𝛼! + 𝛾!"𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝! + 𝛽! + 𝜃!!𝑑! 𝑙𝑜𝑔 !! !!!!!!!!   (6) 
where 𝑑! is a vector of households characteristics and 𝜃!!,𝜌!! are associated vector coefficients. 
Note how this demographic component not only helps to represent preferences, but it also 
helps to include the spatial heterogeneity of these preferences, which in the Chilean context is 
important since significant spatial labor sorting has been identified by the literature (Chacon 
& Paredes, 2014). Using the compensated demand, we derive income (𝜂!"), own and crossed-
uncompensated (𝜂!!) and compensated (𝜂!!∗ ) price elasticities. 𝜂!" = 𝛽! + 𝜃!!𝑑! 𝑤! + 1     (7) 𝜂!! = !!! 𝛽! + 𝜃!!𝑑! 𝛼! + 𝛾!" log𝑝!!!!! − 1   (8) 
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𝜂!!∗ = 𝜂!! + 𝜂!" ∗ 𝑤!      (9) 
1.5. Empirical Methodology 
 Let us start by discussing the functional form of the hedonic price function. While 
Rosen (1974) clearly emphasizes the non-linearity of the hedonic price function, the literature 
has not identified a unique and consensual functional form (see  Halvorsen & Pollakowski 
(1981) for an initial review). We follow previous literature regarding hedonic prices in Chile 
and we specify a log-linear functional form where hedonic prices are derived for each housing 
attribute:5 𝑙𝑛 𝑃 = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑍!! + 𝜀     (10) 
 𝑝!" = 𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑍! = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑙𝑛𝑃 𝛼!    (11) 
 
where 𝑃 and 𝑍 are housing rent price and housing attributes vectors, respectively6. Finally, we 
run the hedonic regression by region, namely 13 regions, for two reasons. First, we want to 
represent the spatial heterogeneity of preferences due to the diverse climatic and economic 
conditions throughout Chile that create differences in the supply of housing attributes 
available and chosen by consumers. Second, the tremendous distances between regions make 
it impossible to observe the clearing conditions among regional housing markets, which make 
us believe that differentiated regional hedonic prices would be a more realistic assumption. 
 Using the hedonic prices indicated in equation (11), we proceed to estimate the 
simultaneous system of equations defined in equation (6). We use a Non-Linear Seemly 
Unrelated Regression (NLSUR) and we incorporate the constraints imposed by adding-up, 
homogeneity, and Slutsky symmetry.  																																																								
5 See Paredes (2011) , Lopez & Aroca (2012) and Iturra Rivera & Paredes (2012). 
6 Complete econometric details are not discussed her, but codes can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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1.6. Data  
This paper uses data from the Chilean Socioeconomic Household Survey (CASEN in 
Spanish) from 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2011. Although this is a cross-section survey that 
started in the early 1990s it has only included housing price questions as well as housing and 
household characteristics since 2000. Having both housing and households’ characteristics 
allows us to control for demographic variables in revealing consumer preferences, a feature 
that is crucial for our empirical strategy.  
Even when the survey includes enough housing attributes, most of them are dummy 
variables that do not permit the variability to be incorporated in the demand system. 
Additionally, the survey does not incorporate housing addresses and so we cannot directly 
control for location. We face both of the aforementioned problems using a similar strategy as 
in Garcia & Raya (2011).  First, instead of using each of the individual housing attributes, we 
group them into four dimensions. The first dimension is Housing Size (HS), which is the total 
number of rooms. Secondly, we have Housing Quality (HQ), which groups housing quality 
variables into an index describing materiality and conservation for floors, walls and ceilings.7  
The third group is a set of variables such as landline, refrigerator, water heater, washer 
and computer (which are only available as dummy variables) that were incorporated into an 
index called Housing Features (HF). To construct this index we tested two main approaches. 
The first is Factor Analysis in which we reduce 5 housing feature variables into one factor that 
explains the majority of the underlying variance. The second approach is a weighted average 
index proposed in Parsons (1986)8. Although both resulting indices are consistent and produce 
																																																								
7 This follows the recommendations of the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Center (CELADE in 
Spanish) 
8 Please see 1.13. Annex for complete details about the construction and result tables for both Housing Features 
definitions. Appendix A1 shows the HS computed trough a Factorial Analysis, while A2 shows the weighted 
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robust results, we prefer to include the index based on Factor Analysis in our estimations 
since its construction and interpretation are more parsimonious.  Moreover, results from the 
Factor Analysis are quite confirmatory since only one factor was retained (positive 
eigenvalue) and all factor loadings are positive suggesting that the predicted factor will 
contain most of the information described in the individual variables.  
We propose a fourth dimension called Housing Location (HL) but it must be carefully 
interpreted because of the lack of information about the exact address of each house in the 
CASEN survey. To overcome this limitation this paper follows the approach used in Garcia & 
Raya (2011) who countered the same problem using an ingenious strategy. The authors 
discovered that the second best way of capturing locational effects when the actual location is 
not available is assuming that the level of schooling of the household head be a satisfactory 
proxy for a desirable neighborhood. The intuition behind this assumption is that households 
with higher education levels will enjoy a higher income and hence be able to access houses 
located in more preferable areas. Garcia & Raya (2011) supports this assumption by including 
a set of fixed effects at the lowest level of spatial aggregation in the hedonic regressions, and 
then comparing those coefficients with the education level via a correlation coefficient. Even 
when this procedure does not explicitly highlight the individual local amenities affecting a 
particular housing price, these effects should be captured by the coefficients of each dummy. 
In fact, Garcia & Raya (2011) find a strong correlation (close to 0.9) (p. 5), which is expected 
since their data is only for Barcelona and hence the disaggregation level is also higher. In our 
case, we find a weaker correlation (close to 0.4), which is expected since the lowest 
disaggregation level available is the municipality and more than one small housing market can 																																																																																																																																																																													
average proposed by Parsons (1986). All our results consider the index built by Factorial Analysis, but we use 
the Parson’s index to evaluate the robustness of them.  
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be contained in a single municipality. Nonetheless, its positive sign is interpreted here as a 
signal to support our use of the variable “years of schooling” as a proxy for housing location. 
 Due to changes in variable names and codifications over time, prior to conducting 
estimations it was necessary to achieve consistency as well as to select only relevant variables 
and observations.9 However, and as noted before, the main attractiveness of the data is that all 
Chilean regions are represented in the sample for which the 13-regions classification was 
chosen10. This is portrayed in Figure 1.1 along with the municipality classification. 
 Finally and using the aforementioned data, a set of additional calculations and filters 
was created in order to conduct the estimations11. Here it is worth noting that we were forced 
to focus solely on the demand estimations for the renters subsample in this paper since 
housing prices for owners in 2011 are missing. Although we do not propose an econometric 
exercise to deal with a potential problem of selection bias, we expect a future paper will 
include the estimation of the demand systems for both owners and renters, since we 
acknowledge the importance of characterizing the two types of consumers. This is not only 
because of their intrinsic differences on how they evaluate housing choices, but also because 
recent developments in Chilean housing policy have targeted both groups of consumers. 
 
1.7. Empirical Analysis 
We begin the empirical analysis with the hedonic regressions and Table 1.2 shows the 
estimated coefficients for equation (10). As discussed in the previous section, we estimate this 																																																								
9 Stata scripts for compilation, consistency, and cleaning are available to the reader upon request. Additionally, 
the Stata format data sets are available at http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/casen_obj.php. 
Used together, the reader should be able to construct the data set used in this paper. 
10 Although since 2006 the new regional classification contemplates 15 regions, it was only possible to aggregate 
the years 2006-2011, leaving 13 regions and 343 municipalities (US counties equivalent)  
11 An example of these filters is eliminating observations with missing or null renting price, etc. All filters are 
also available upon request. 
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regression for each of the 13 regions portrayed in Figure 1.1. Given that housing attributes are 
considered consumption goods, we expect positive coefficients to be associated with each one 
of the four characteristics. Besides paying attention to the coefficient signs, we follow the 
literature on hedonic prices which suggest we take advantage of the log-linear form which is 
used here to discuss the coefficients as pseudo-elasticities (Cropper et al., 1988). Housing 
Size (HS) shows a positive and significant coefficient in each region implying that larger 
houses have higher renting prices. In particular, HS ranges from 4.37% (I Region of Tarapacá) 
to 13.8% (IV Region de O’Higgins). This variability of pseudo-elasticity across regions can 
be understood as initial evidence to support our hypothesis of spatial heterogeneity. The rest 
of the housing attributes also show a positive coefficient, with their magnitudes differing 
among themselves and across regions. For example, Housing Quality (HQ) is the highest 
coefficient for all regions, while our proxy of Housing Location (HL) is the lowest coefficient, 
with both housing attributes statistically significant in all regions.  
Nevertheless, as the previous analysis and literature highlight, real economic meaning 
must be derived from the estimation of a system of equations Rosen (1974) instead of only 
using hedonic regressions. An empirical reason to not rely on hedonic regressions alone is the 
fact that significance levels vary across regions, which is presumably due to different sample 
sizes. While the Metropolitan Region of Santiago consists of 42% of the total population, 
regions such as Aysén (XI) make up less than 1% (see Figure 1.1). This fact has direct 
consequences on sample sizes obtained from CASEN where the Aysén Region (XI) sample 
size accounts only for 10% of the Metropolitan Region sample size (930 versus 9204). Albeit 
these differences in sample sizes and significance levels, the estimated coefficients for 
housing attributes are significant for almost all regions. 
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Our data posed an additional empirical particularity given that we are using pooled 
data, i.e. different cross-section samples collected over time, for which we included a dummy 
variable by year to control for temporal shocks associated with housing markets (Wooldridge, 
2012). Estimated coefficients show that yearly effects are significant only for some regions, 
which supports the theory that a housing market’s structural equilibriums differ among 
regions. Additionally, the fact that yearly effects are not significant for all regions allows us to 
eliminate the need for varying housing attributes’ coefficients per year.  
Finally, there were two additional empirical issues that are worth mentioning. First, we 
controlled for the type of housing. The benchmark category is a house, while House Type B 
(See Table 1.1) indicates an apartment and House Type C (See Table 1.1) indicates a shelter 
with a lower structural quality than houses and apartments. The estimated coefficients again 
show the expected signs: apartments have, on average, lower prices than houses. Second and 
similar to housing type, rural zone plays the role of an important control variable. We 
expected that rural housing does not capture the economics of agglomeration derived from 
large urban areas and consequently would have lower prices (Combes & Duranton, 2011). 
Our estimations do not support this hypothesis for each region since in most cases the 
coefficients are not significant implying an unclear effect of this variable. Even when we are 
not primarily concerned about these control variables, we accept that they are factors that 
must be controlled for. As a result, our control strategy generates an r-squared between 0.367 
and 0.583 which is a good level of fit for micro data such as households. 
Once we checked the empirical performance of the hedonic regressions, we used 
equation (11) to generate hedonic prices for each observation. Table 1.3 portrays descriptive 
statistics for these hedonic prices. HQ is the most expensive attribute on average (8.84) 
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followed by HF (7.79), then HS (6.97) and finally HL (5.93). Once hedonic prices were 
calculated, we estimated the demand system specified in equation (6). Table 1.4 shows the 
parameters obtained through Non-Linear SUR. As can be seen, these parameters can hardly be 
discussed given the high non-linearity of these functions. However, they are of crucial 
relevance in estimating our elasticities defined by equations (7), (8) and (9). Table 1.5 shows 
income elasticities for different demographic components evaluated at median values. Moving 
from left to right, the results show that HQ and HF are considered luxury goods. This implies 
that consumers will spend relatively more on HQ and HF as their income increases. 
Conversely, HS and HL are perceived as normal goods, also understood as basic necessities, 
implying that their consumption changes less than proportionally to response to income 
variations. Finally, we note that all the elasticities are bigger than zero, which rules out the 
existence of inferior goods, i.e. all housing attributes show increases in consumption as 
income increases. 
As we move to the right of Table 1.5, we explore how these elasticities vary from 
small households to larger households. Results support the presence of small differences 
between elasticities for smaller (less than or equal to 2) and larger (greater than or equal to 4) 
household sizes. However, in spite of these small differences found, the estimated confidence 
intervals indicate they are significant. Moreover, is important to note that our classification of 
housing attributes as basic necessities (HS and HL) and as luxuries (HQ and HF) is robust 
regardless of household size. Although this point will be discussed with more detail in our 
conclusions, these results constitute a relevant piece of evidence in claiming that continuous 
increases in income without tackling Chile’s income inequality will result in continuous 
increases in the demand of housing quality and housing features, but only for the more 
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accommodated sectors. This result has important policy implications as it highlights that being 
oblivious to consumer preferences in housing demand might result in widening inequalities, 
since income increases have different effects depending on the household’s economic 
situation.  
After defining HQ and HF as luxury goods, we proceed to detect what attributes 
present high or low elasticity against price variations. Tables 1.6 and 1.7 report 
uncompensated and compensated price elasticities, respectively12. All housing attributes 
behave according to the well-known Law of Demand, i.e. consumers decrease their 
consumption as the price of these attributes rises, but there are differences in the magnitudes. 
Generally speaking, both tables indicate than HS and HL seem to be price-inelastic goods. 
This implies that consumers are less willing to sacrifice size and location even if the price 
increases when compared to other housing attributes. This result is in accordance with the 
aforementioned income elasticities since for those attributes classified as luxuries (i.e. non-
easily affordable) consumers are much more elastic to price variations, whereas for those 
attributes classified as necessities or basic goods (i.e. more affordable), price elasticities are 
higher, which confirms their status of necessities.  
Finally, Figure 1.2 presents income elasticity estimates at the regional level for each 
housing attribute. Although they are visually non-distinguishable in most cases, these 
estimations include confidence intervals displayed as continuous areas. Indeed, the fact that 
the error areas are quite close to the point estimates provides further reassurance of the 
existence of spatial heterogeneity in the way households react to income changes.  
In the case of Housing Size, there is not enough empirical evidence to confirm our 
expectations regarding regional heterogeneity. The figures show how HS income elasticities 																																																								
12 The only difference between both elasticities is the incorporation of income effects. 
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differ only marginally across regions with the exception of the Antofagasta Region (II). 
However, a feasible explanation about this difference is related to the markedly higher 
housing prices in this region which is found in Paredes (2011) and Iturra Rivera & Paredes 
(2011). We suspect that the particularly high housing demand in the Antofagasta region is 
pushing prices up resulting in a significant reduction in the income elasticity for this region. 
Although this seems to be a stylized fact for the Antofagasta region, we accept that we do not 
have more evidence to explore this issue in detail and so we must leave this for future 
research. 
Figure 1.2 also portrays regional income elasticities for all Chilean regions and their 
differences across household sizes. Consistent with the national results discussed previously, 
smaller households have higher income elasticities than larger households. This result is also 
robust across regions since the different households’ estimations are monotonically higher as 
household size increases. In summary, the results in this section suggest the presence of 
stronger spatial heterogeneity for Housing Quality and Housing Location. 
 
1.8. Caveats and Future Policy Directions 
Much like housing policy, the way research is conducted has also changed over time, allowing 
for more detailed analysis as new and better data is released. Back in the very first days of the 
“Council of Housing” in 1947, housing policy was mainly based on raw numbers regarding 
levels of sanitation, crowdedness, and lack of housing stock among others. In the last decades 
the way housing policy is informed has improved in Chile, but we highlight in this paper that 
there is still room for growth. Today, we present research results that go beyond the raw 
description of deficits, and that describe household preferences in terms of their current 
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housing choices. Together with the many other studies reviewed in this paper about housing in 
Chile, we are certainly much better suited to inform housing policy.  
 However, how close is the current Chilean research in housing compared to those 
countries that we look up to? In May 2010 Chile was welcomed to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This was a positive advance in terms of 
recognizing Chile’s economic stability and its potential to improve. However it has also 
served as a way to become more accountable regarding how Chile approaches its different 
sectors and housing was no exception. In 2012 the OECD released a study evaluating the 
different housing policies Chile has implemented and should be implementing towards 
creating a “better functioning housing market”. In Sánchez (2012) a great deal of 
recommendations and analysis conclude that Chile needs to improve the way it designs its 
housing policy. Inspired by this study, we have focused our research here and we have 
discovered potential gaps and caveats in our own research. We also point in the direction that 
future policy should go.  
1.8.1 Renters vs. Owners and their revealed preferences. 
This study captures the renting market and leaves out the owners’ market for several reasons. 
The first reason is data constraints, since the CASEN survey only provides stated/imputed-
renting prices to owners and these prices are missing for 2011. Second, the owners market in 
Chile is potentially distorted since housing policy in Chile has emphasized ownership when 
providing housing subsidies. Because our purpose is to capture the nature of housing 
preferences itself, and because it could be argued that the owners’ market is highly distorted 
yielding revealed preferences of sub-optimal choices, we believe that studying the renters’ 
market under the aforementioned limited conditions is the best way to go for now. The results 
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we present can be biased in the sense that we are not controlling for what determines renting 
in the first place, but we believe that the degree of distortion is of a lesser nature than if we 
included owners considering the current data. A clear policy implication of this is the 
necessity to improve the consistency and veracity of owners’ data so a similar study can be 
conducted including the owners market. 
1.8.2 Housing quality 
As mentioned in Sánchez (2012), the new housing policy should include better quality 
standards in building regulations, especially those that consider better heating systems that are 
efficient and environmentally friendly. This claim reveals a potential gap in the data used in 
this research since there is no question that considers households’ heating consumption, which 
although heterogeneously important across the country, it is still a significant concern when 
representing housing expenditure. Although we understand the difficulties associated with 
gathering data of this nature, we agree with Sánchez (2012) that this dimension should be 
captured both in new construction standards as well as in future surveys. 
1.8.3 Housing Location 
In this study a household’s education level has been used as a proxy for housing location. 
Although we warn of and recognize the potential endogeneity that this might induce in the 
model estimates, we believe that there is something to gain. In particular and following 
Sánchez (2012) and Soto & Torche (2004), we also believe that the way housing policy was 
implemented in Chile has widened spatial segregation because of the high incentives to build 
on cheaper land located at the periphery of the city. As pointed out by Sánchez, the link 
between spatial segregation and education outcomes is evident in Chile where “richer 
municipalities have better education and achieve better results on basic education performance 
25 
tests than poorer ones”(p.22). As a result, and although there is currently no other way to free 
our estimations of the potential endogeneity between income levels and housing prices, we 
agree with the aforementioned evidence pointing to the strong links between spatial location 
and education levels, and hence to the adequacy of using education levels as the second best 
option to capture housing location. Not surprisingly, and as we stated before in our results, we 
find that households value location as a necessity and that they are not willing to make 
changes under scenarios where incomes decrease or prices increase. 
1.8.4 The regional dimension of housing policy 
A particular feature of our study was the explicit consideration of different housing markets in 
our estimations. Although the results are partially confirmatory, we believe that they are 
enough evidence of the heterogeneous nature of housing markets across regions in Chile. For 
years, this nature has been ignored in housing policy formulations, which has limited regional 
considerations to mere accounts of housing deficits. In this context, this research follows a 
line of inquiry that considers regional housing price differences and hypothesizes that they are 
a potential outcome of heterogeneous housing markets across the country. Our results point 
precisely in that direction, which increases the level of urgency for housing policy to take into 
account not only the current heterogeneous outcomes in housing preferences, but also the way 
the financing of housing projects is conducted since different economic realities may also 
affect the conditions for lending/owning and renting across regions. 
 In summary, we hope the current results and this examination in terms of the current 
policy and data availability might result in healthier housing markets in Chile. 
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1.9. Conclusions 
Chile has scarce scientific research regarding the economic valuation of housing attributes. In 
particular, we believe that we have shown enough evidence to claim that Chile and those 
countries following its developments in housing policy need housing attribute demand 
estimations and consequently income and price elasticities derived from those demand 
systems. As argued before, this information is crucial when designing housing policy because 
it provides a more complete picture of the way a household values housing attributes and the 
effect that changes in prices and income would have on their demand. Moreover, high price 
spatial differentials raise concerns about how consumers react to price changes among 
regional markets. 
In particular, we find that Housing Quality and Housing Features are considered 
luxury goods, implying that these goods are consumed in a higher proportional variation due 
to income increments. Alternatively, our results suggest that poor families will be mainly 
concerned about Housing Quality and Features only if their income rises. Conversely, 
Housing Size and Housing Location are price inelastic, which implies that both characteristics 
are highly valuable to consumers and that they are willing to pay for them even when facing 
price shocks. Our empirical evidence is significant for each region of Chile. 
Our results are interesting for policy makers in at least two areas. First, housing policy 
should be focused on those housing attributes with high price elasticity. The reason behind 
this suggestion lies on the fact that if everything else remains constant (including Chile’s wide 
income inequality), income and price shocks would have a greater effect on those households 
with fewer options to modify their consumption (i.e. high price elasticity), a precarious 
situation for poorer households.  In this context, Housing Size and Housing Location should 
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be attributes with higher priority when developing housing investments financed by public 
projects. Regarding Housing Size, we claim that new housing projects must not be necessary 
focused on quantity, namely a large number of new homes with a small size, but rather new 
housing projects should provide larger houses even if it means offering less of them. In 
relation to Housing Location, new projects must be carried out in areas with high spatial 
connection within cities.  
A potentially new public policy should focus on balancing households’ needs of better 
location and size. Even when we accept that our results are not the final word in this political 
scenario, we trust that our research has at least provided new insights that might initiate a new 
outline of public policy in which the consumer’s preference are at the core of the 
interventions. 
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1.10. TABLES 
 
Table 1.1: Descriptive analysis for hedonic regression 
Variable Description min mean p50 max sd 
Ln(Rent 
Price) Natural Logaritm of Monthly Rent Prices in CLP 9.21 11.17 11.16 12.90 0.67 
HS Housing Size: Total number of Rooms in the house 1.00 5.25 5.00 36.00 1.60 
HQ Housing Quality: Index based on floor, walls and ceilings 0.01 0.75 0.79 1.00 0.23 
HL Housing Location: Proxy by years of schooling 1.00 11.44 12.00 23.00 3.70 
WasherD Dummy for Washer Yes=1, No=0 0.00 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.45 
RefrigeratorD Dummy for Refrigerator Yes=1, No=0 0.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.27 
LandlineD Dummy for Landline Yes=1, No=0 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.46 
WaterHeaterD Dummy for Water Heater Yes=1, No=0 0.00 0.66 1.00 1.00 0.47 
ComputerD Dummy for Computer Yes=1, No=0 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Year2003D Dummy for Year 2003=1, otherwise=0 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.39 
Year2006D Dummy for Year 2006=1, otherwise=0 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.40 
Year2009D Dummy for Year 2009=1, otherwise=0 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.40 
Year2011D Dummy for Year 2011=1, otherwise=0 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.43 
HouseTypeB Dummy for Apartment=1, otherwise=0 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.33 
HouseTypeC Dummy for Other house type=1, otherwise=0 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.14 
Zone Dummy for Zone, Urban=1, Rural=0 0.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.29 
Note:  33,733 Observations 
     		
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics for Almost Ideal Demand System 
Variable Description min mean p50 max sd 
HS Housing Size 1.00 5.25 5.00 36.00 1.60 
HQ Housing Quality 0.01 0.75 0.79 1.00 0.23 
HF Housing Features 0.44 1.66 1.73 2.66 0.67 
HL Housing Location 1.00 11.44 12.00 23.00 3.70 
z1 Household Size 1.00 3.51 3.00 15.00 1.55 
s_HS Share of expenditure in HS 0.01 0.26 0.25 0.71 0.10 
s_HQ Share of expenditure in HL 0.01 0.33 0.33 0.84 0.13 
s_HF Share of expenditure in HF 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.54 0.06 
s_HL Share of expenditure in HL 0.01 0.22 0.23 0.67 0.07 
lnp1 log(Hedonic price for HS) 6.97 8.87 8.89 11.30 0.50 
lnp2 log(Hedonic price for HQ) 8.84 11.08 11.09 13.69 0.67 
lnp3 log(Hedonic price for HF) 7.79 9.74 9.76 11.54 0.50 
lnp4 log(Hedonic price for HL) 5.93 7.97 7.99 10.06 0.54 
lnw log(Total expenditure in 4 Attributes) 8.23 11.90 11.96 14.70 0.76 
Note:  33,733 Observations 
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Table 1.3: Hedonic Regression with Housing Feature using Factorial Analysis  
Dependent variable: log(Rent Price) 	
Variable Tarapacá 
(I) 
Antofagasta 
(II) 
Atacama 
(III) 
Coquimbo 
(IV) 
Valparaiso 
(V) 
O’Higgins 
(VI) 
Maule 
(VII) 
Biobio 
(VIII) 
Araucanía 
(IX) 
Los Lagos 
(X) 
Aysén 
(XI) 
Magallanes 
(XII) 
Metropolitana 
(R.M) 
HS 0.0525 0.0437 0.0912 0.129 0.127 0.138 0.127 0.112 0.130 0.0686 0.0701 0.0762 0.0891 
 (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.0189) (0.0135) (0.0102) (0.01000) (0.0117) (0.0126) (0.0183) (0.00858) (0.0173) (0.0209) (0.00626) 
HQ 0.751 2.322 1.229 0.960 0.407 0.702 1.042 0.752 0.816 1.312 0.690 0.733 0.920 
 (0.280) (0.403) (0.344) (0.221) (0.159) (0.140) (0.171) (0.208) (0.182) (0.157) (0.332) (0.296) (0.0984) 
HF 0.263 0.258 0.223 0.248 0.224 0.175 0.279 0.229 0.279 0.209 0.198 0.184 0.208 
 (0.0324) (0.0340) (0.0461) (0.0278) (0.0200) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0315) (0.0387) (0.0230) (0.0443) (0.0415) (0.0124) 
HL 0.0299 0.0286 0.0373 0.0387 0.0417 0.0397 0.0398 0.0464 0.0291 0.0280 0.0328 0.0392 0.0438 
 (0.00627) (0.00753) (0.00788) (0.00428) (0.00307) (0.00436) (0.00428) (0.00542) (0.00621) (0.00372) (0.00638) (0.00909) (0.00193) 
Year2003D -0.144 0.0460 -0.0595 -0.0187 -0.0180 -0.0549 -0.0676 -0.0203 -0.00519 -0.00676 0.0789 -0.0681 -0.00406 
 (0.0686) (0.0653) (0.0785) (0.0553) (0.0294) (0.0477) (0.0449) (0.0359) (0.0686) (0.0473) (0.0730) (0.111) (0.0187) 
Year2006D -0.102 0.0728 -0.0221 0.0392 -0.0133 -0.00195 -0.0480 0.00120 -0.128 0.00370 0.143 -0.0560 0.0293 
 (0.0714) (0.0707) (0.0766) (0.0566) (0.0289) (0.0480) (0.0396) (0.0318) (0.0544) (0.0470) (0.0697) (0.109) (0.0196) 
Year2009D -0.0501 0.373 0.0993 0.198 0.118 0.128 0.0613 0.0521 -0.0102 0.158 0.371 0.0646 0.159 
 (0.0713) (0.0722) (0.0838) (0.0543) (0.0308) (0.0444) (0.0446) (0.0440) (0.0540) (0.0490) (0.0678) (0.104) (0.0200) 
Year2011D -0.0424 0.114 0.234 -0.0193 0.0863 0.134 -0.209 -0.00170 -0.223 -0.515 0.174 0.0362 0.0430 
 (0.0912) (0.0878) (0.0990) (0.0670) (0.0509) (0.0561) (0.0604) (0.0743) (0.0886) (0.106) (0.128) (0.181) (0.0281) 
HouseTypeB -0.168 0.0344 -0.394 0.370 0.0485 -0.182 -0.186 0.193 0.0353 -0.221 0.125 -0.359 0.110 
 (0.0702) (0.0699) (0.141) (0.107) (0.0392) (0.0396) (0.0836) (0.0523) (0.0647) (0.0758) (0.198) (0.156) (0.0198) 
HouseTypeC -0.0136 0.729 0.121 0.346 0.282 0.0248 0.367 0.0116 0.182 0.0704 0.290 0.110 0.135 
 (0.103) (0.238) (0.160) (0.195) (0.144) (0.165) (0.108) (0.124) (0.162) (0.0995) (0.159) (0.160) (0.0558) 
Zone -0.0441 -0.689 -0.237 0.131 0.119 0.112 -0.00417 0.0284 0.000364 -0.149 0.0706 -0.517 0.0476 
 (0.112) (0.141) (0.135) (0.0897) (0.0850) (0.0587) (0.0682) (0.0873) (0.0770) (0.0544) (0.123) (0.278) (0.0648) 
Constant 9.883 9.109 8.990 8.568 9.190 8.891 8.575 8.993 9.115 9.805 9.614 10.32 9.202 
 (0.141) (0.209) (0.195) (0.121) (0.0814) (0.0894) (0.0706) (0.0630) (0.113) (0.0701) (0.108) (0.316) (0.0692) 
N 2029 1678 979 1132 3917 1903 2168 4091 1925 3164 930 591 9204 
R-sq 0.367 0.509 0.417 0.583 0.452 0.510 0.571 0.553 0.532 0.488 0.499 0.486 0.498 
Standard errors in parentheses		
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Table 1.4: AIDS for Housing Attributes (AIDS-HA) parameter estimates 
 Without 
Demographics*** 
With 
Demographics*** 
α1 0.352 0.354 
α2 -0.0371 -0.0294 
α3 0.198 0.184 
β1 -0.0215 -0.0121 
β2 0.0575 0.0687 
β3 0.0301 0.00402 
γ11 0.183 0.178 
γ12 -0.0817 -0.0798 
γ13 -0.0379 -0.0348 
γ22 0.200 0.202 
γ23 -0.0481 -0.0532 
γ33 0.115 0.119 
ρ1 -0.0221 -0.0270 
θ11 -0.00914 -0.00942 
θ21 0.00595 0.00693 
θ31 -0.000726 -0.00146 
Constant -0.000726 -0.00146 
N 33733 33733 ***	All	variables	are	significant	at	p<0.001							
Table 1.5: Income Elasticities 
AIDSHA without Demographics  AIDSHA with Demographics 
Household Size = 3  Small Families: Household Size ≤ 2 Big Families: Household Size ≥ 4 
Elasticity HS HQ HF HL  Elasticity HS HQ HF HL Elasticity HS HQ HF HL 
Income 0.8081 1.2245 1.1502 0.7566  Income 0.8376 1.2032 1.1548 0.7448 Income 0.7803 1.2459 1.1451 0.7681 
CI-lower 0.8070 1.2245 1.1497 0.7562  CI-lower 0.8361 1.2013 1.1538 0.7426 CI-lower 0.7797 1.2452 1.1447 0.7641 
CI-upper 0.8092 1.2245 1.1507 0.7571  CI-upper 0.8391 1.2052 1.1558 0.7469 CI-upper 0.7809 1.2467 1.1456 0.7721 
Note: Confidence Intervals calculated using bootstrap with 300 repetitions
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Table 1.6: Uncompensated Price Elasticities 
Household Size = 3  
 HS HQ HF HL 
HS -0.2422 -0.2394 -0.1069 -0.2196 
CI-lower -0.2434 -0.2401 -0.1071 -0.2198 
CI-upper -0.2411 -0.2386 -0.1066 -0.2194 
HQ -0.2876 -0.4989 -0.1923 -0.2457 
CI-lower -0.2885 -0.4990 -0.1931 -0.2474 
CI-upper -0.2867 -0.4989 -0.1914 -0.2441 
HF -0.2336 -0.3226 -0.4118 -0.1822 
CI-lower -0.2339 -0.3242 -0.4143 -0.1823 
CI-upper -0.2334 -0.3209 -0.4093 -0.1822 
HL -0.2370 -0.2118 -0.0782 -0.2296 
CI-lower -0.2371 -0.2120 -0.0784 -0.2312 
CI-upper -0.2368 -0.2117 -0.0781 -0.2280 
Note: Confidence Intervals calculated using bootstrap with 300 repetitions 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.7: Compensated Price Elasticities 
Household Size = 3 
 HS HQ HF HL 
HS -0.0364 -0.0336 0.0990 -0.0138 
CI-lower -0.0388 -0.0338 0.0967 -0.0159 
CI-upper -0.0341 -0.0333 0.1012 -0.0117 
HQ 0.1236 -0.0877 0.2190 0.1655 
CI-lower 0.1169 -0.0880 0.2176 0.1634 
CI-upper 0.1303 -0.0874 0.2204 0.1676 
HF -0.0199 -0.1089 -0.1981 0.0315 
CI-lower -0.0220 -0.1093 -0.1982 0.0312 
CI-upper -0.0178 -0.1084 -0.1979 0.0318 
HL -0.0677 -0.0426 0.0910 -0.0604 
CI-lower -0.0680 -0.0448 0.0905 -0.0619 
CI-upper -0.0675 -0.0403 0.0915 -0.0589 
Note: Confidence Intervals calculated using bootstrap with 300 repetitions 
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1.11. FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1. Map of Chile and its regional and communal administrative boundaries 
 
 
 33 
 
Figure 1.2. Regional Income Elasticities for Housing Attributes 
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1.13. Annex: Housing Features index construction 
 
A.1 Housing Features Index based on Factor Analysis 
 
Table 1.8. Factor Analysis Summary table of Results 
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs: 33733 
Method: principal factors Retained factors: 1 
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of parameters: 5 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 0.88175 0.8841 1.7124 1.7124 
Factor2 -0.00235 0.04871 -0.0046 1.7079 
Factor3 -0.05106 0.08572 -0.0992 1.6087 
Factor4 -0.13678 0.03988 -0.2656 1.3431 
Factor5 -0.17665 . -0.3431 1 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(10) = 1.0e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Factor Loadings 
    Variable Factor1 Uniqueness 
  Washer 0.4092 0.8325 
  Refrigerator 0.1995 0.9602 
  Landline 0.4556 0.7924 
  Computer 0.4615 0.787 
  Water Heater 0.5038 0.7462 
   
 
A.2 Housing Features Index based on Parsons (1986) 
 
Parsons (1986) proposes a weighted average index resulting from a first step in which he 
computes a hedonic regression similar to equation (10) but were the complete set of 
housing attributes (Z=[A, F]) are now divided into two matrices with the regular housing 
attributes (A) plus a matrix of housing features variables (F) only, in our case: Washer, 
Refrigerator, Landline, Computer and Water Heater, yielding the following hedonic 
regression. 
 𝑙𝑛 𝑃 = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝐴!! + 𝛼!𝐹!! + 𝜀    (A.2.1) 
Once this regression was estimated, the Housing Features index for an individual i is 
estimated by: 
 𝐻𝐹! = 𝛼!𝐹!! mean 𝛼!𝐹!!       (A.2.2) 
 
As a way to provide a robustness check, Table A.2.2. shows the results of the hedonic 
regressions proposed in equation (10) using the Housing Features index based on Parsons 
(1986) and which can be compared with Table 3. As the reader can see, all coefficients are 
consistent between the two tables.
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Table 1.9 Hedonic Regressions with Housing Features based on Parsons (1986) 
Dependent variable: log(Rent Price) 	
Variable Tarapacá 
(I) 
Antofagasta 
(II) 
Atacama 
(III) 
Coquimbo 
(IV) 
Valparaiso 
(V) 
O’Higgins 
(VI) 
Maule 
(VII) 
Biobio 
(VIII) 
Araucanía 
(IX) 
Los Lagos 
(X) 
Aysén 
(XI) 
Magallanes 
(XII) 
Metropolitana 
(R.M) 
HS 0.0547 0.0446 0.0922 0.134 0.130 0.142 0.132 0.116 0.130 0.0707 0.0706 0.0785 0.0919 
 (0.0125) (0.0146) (0.0188) (0.0138) (0.0103) (0.00999) (0.0117) (0.0127) (0.0177) (0.00853) (0.0173) (0.0212) (0.00627) 
HQ 0.792 2.370 1.270 1.009 0.438 0.738 1.076 0.790 0.860 1.366 0.703 0.793 0.960 
 (0.279) (0.41) (0.346) (0.225) (0.159) (0.142) (0.173) (0.206) (0.179) (0.16) (0.333) (0.3) (0.0985) 
HF 0.262 0.270 0.228 0.230 0.221 0.155 0.263 0.220 0.283 0.191 0.207 0.167 0.203 
 (0.0334) (0.0363) (0.0468) (0.0284) (0.0215) (0.026) (0.0246) (0.0305) (0.0374) (0.0246) (0.048) (0.042) (0.0132) 
HL 0.0314 0.0301 0.0380 0.0406 0.0430 0.0410 0.0422 0.0484 0.0305 0.0303 0.0337 0.0410 0.0456 
 (.00616) (0.00743) (0.00777) (0.0043) (0.00309) (0.00437) (0.00421) (0.00533) (0.00588) (0.00377) (0.00647) (0.00907) (0.00193) 
Year2003D -0.139 0.0509 -0.0676 -0.0172 -0.0248 -0.0527 -0.0672 -0.0254 -0.00825 -0.0189 0.0817 -0.0642 -0.00629 
 (0.0693) (0.0661) (0.0792) (0.0565) (0.0298) (0.048) (0.0452) (0.0363) (0.0667) (0.048) (0.0736) (0.113) (0.0188) 
Year2006D -0.0939 0.0741 -0.0244 0.0389 -0.0183 -0.00401 -0.0466 -0.0012 -0.132 -0.00288 0.139 -0.0575 0.0266 
 (0.0716) (0.071) (0.0769) (0.0576) (0.0291) (0.0484) (0.0393) (0.0323) (0.0542) (0.0477) (0.07) (0.109) (0.0197) 
Year2009D -0.0387 0.383 0.0996 0.201 0.117 0.130 0.0621 0.0515 -0.0178 0.151 0.372 0.0699 0.159 
 (0.0711) (0.0723) (0.0834) (0.0548) (0.0312) (0.0447) (0.0444) (0.0439) (0.0539) (0.0495) (0.0678) (0.105) (0.0202) 
Year2011D -0.0446 0.11 0.229 -0.0228 0.0789 0.130 -0.213 -0.0137 -0.241 -0.546 0.168 0.0168 0.0343 
 (0.091) (0.0894) (0.0993) (0.0682) (0.0511) (0.0565) (0.061) (0.0745) (0.0872) (0.108) (0.129) (0.182) (0.0282) 
HouseTypeB -0.181 0.0459 -0.384 0.366 0.0461 -0.188 -0.191 0.191 0.029 -0.231 0.122 -0.371 0.108 
 (0.0701) (0.0709) (0.14) (0.111) (0.0393) (0.0403) (0.0834) (0.0531) (0.0662) (0.0772) (0.198) (0.155) (0.0199) 
HouseTypeC -0.0080 0.748 0.128 0.371 0.300 0.0449 0.406 0.0327 0.197 0.0883 0.293 0.138 0.154 
 (0.104) (0.237) (0.16) (0.202) (0.144) (0.168) (0.111) (0.125) (0.163) (0.101) (0.161) (0.159) (0.0557) 
Zone -0.0486 -0.709 -0.244 0.124 0.12 0.111 -0.00974 0.0211 -0.00875 -0.155 0.0685 -0.524 0.046 
 (0.111) (0.142) (0.136) (0.0918) (0.0835) (0.0596) (0.0691) (0.0872) (0.076) (0.0548) (0.123) (0.275) (0.0654) 
Constant 9.785 9.000 8.903 8.472 9.106 8.833 8.474 8.912 9.030 9.752 9.540 10.27 9.116 
 (0.139) (0.208) (0.193) (0.121) (0.0807) (0.0914) (0.0714) (0.0632) (0.107) (0.0722) (0.108) (0.316) (0.0688) 
N 2029 1678 979 1132 3917 1903 2168 4091 1925 3164 930 591 9204 
R-sq 0.367 0.509 0.417 0.583 0.452 0.510 0.571 0.553 0.532 0.488 0.499 0.486 0.498 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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CHAPTER 2: HOUSING PRICE INDICES FOR SMALL SPATIAL UNITS13 
 
Abstract: 
Median-based Housing Price Indices (HPIs) generate potentially misleading indicators 
especially when applied to Small Spatial Units (SSUs) such as small Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) or neighborhoods within larger metropolitan regions.  Given the 
small total number of sales in SSUs and the even smaller number of repeat sales, 
traditional alternatives are few.  A matching-based Fisher HPI is proposed as an 
alternative that provides more accurate estimations for SSUs given that it both controls 
for house characteristics and is not restricted just to repeated sales. This paper makes use 
of housing sales data from the state of Illinois, as an example of the application of the 
methodology to small MSAs and at the neighborhood level within larger MSAs.  The 
results highlight some of the biases that have arisen from the use of median price 
indicators. 
 
  
																																																								
13 I am thankful for the helpful comments in initial versions of this article to professors Geoffrey Hewings, 
Katherine Baylis and Daniel McMillen, as well to the research assistants at the Regional Economics 
Applications Laboratory (REAL) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I am also most 
grateful for the data provided by the Illinois Realtors Association (IAR) 
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2.1. Introduction 
Housing markets play an important role in a regional economy, which has been 
highlighted by the events of the first decade and half of this century.  However, capturing 
the appropriate dimensions of this market has been problematic.  The use of housing 
price indices (HPIs) has been a popular metric, with the focus usually on a median price 
HPI.  However, at smaller spatial scales, the median price index is very sensitive to 
outliers; further, it provides no information on the characteristics of the houses sold, such 
as the size of the house, number of bedrooms, bathrooms and so forth.  To counteract 
some of these deficiencies in the U.S., the Case-Shiller Home Price Index (CS-HPI) has 
been developed to track the behavior of housing prices for the twenty largest 
metropolitan regions.  In its search greater accuracy by only using comparable houses 
(i.e. the repeated sales (RS) approach), the CS-HPI becomes too restrictive for smaller 
spatial units (SSUs) where there may be few or no repeated sales in every period of time.  
This paper offers a methodology that builds upon McMillen (2012) to extend the idea of 
accounting for housing characteristics in contributing to variations in the housing mix and 
thus prices.  In addition, the methodology uses all the houses that are sold through a 
propensity matching algorithm rather than being restricted to perfect matches (repeat 
house sales).  
The importance of having ways to better track housing markets was emphasized 
in the last financial crisis. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report (Angelides & 
Thomas, 2011) argues that there is an urgent need to have more accurate and 
disaggregated information to track the complexity operation of housing markets .  In the 
state of Illinois for example, the CS-HPI is only available for the Chicago Metropolitan 
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Statistical Area (MSA); this is an imperfect proxy for the housing market in Illinois as a 
whole since approximately 30% of the total sales in the state takes place outside Chicago 
MSA every year.   Additionally, between 2004 and 2010, the growth rate for average 
housing sale prices in the case of the Chicago MSA was negative (-26%) in contrast to 
the positive 10% growth experienced by the other MSAs in the state over the same 
period.  
Having a more representative HPI requires consideration of what is comparable.  
Just as important as it is to keep a basket of goods constant across time in the case of 
consumer price indices (CPIs), controlling for housing characteristics is crucial when 
constructing HPIs.  The CS index is trusted to provide a less biased account of housing 
market behavior precisely because it only uses the same houses to create HPIs.  By using 
the same houses, the CS-HPI assumes that the observed price variations are not a product 
of housing characteristics’ variations but only a product of market forces.  However, as 
McMillen (2012) pointed out in his account of the Chicago housing market, there is no 
need to impose such a strong restriction of having the exact same houses to construct a 
comparable set of prices across time. Instead, comparable housing samples can be 
achieved by using matching algorithms that search house clones with the similar 
characteristics.  By using matching instead of repeated sales, HPIs can be estimated with 
larger samples of housing sales since more than just repeated sales are included.  
Ultimately, this helps not only to improve accuracy and representativeness, but also 
allows constructing HPIs for small spatial units. 
Besides the limitations of the current HPIs for SSUs, there are two other issues 
that the literature has overlooked and that are addressed in this paper.  First, most HPIs 
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are based on Laspeyres indices assuming that the basket of housing characteristic remains 
unchanged across time.  In the housing context, this is true as long as the market remains 
stable in terms of consumer preferences for which applying repeated sales (RS) yields a 
fairly good representation of the housing market.  However, this assumption is highly 
unlikely to hold because of several reasons such as: markets where homes are undergoing 
extensive renovations, neighborhoods enjoying higher appreciation rates than others 
(McMillen, 2012), labor market differences inducing migration and hence demographic 
change, etc.  All of these reasons could have been exacerbated due to the financial crisis, 
potentially changing the set of housing characteristics consumers influence with they 
purchasing choices, ultimately affecting consumers’ preferences.  This paper contributes 
to address this problem by using a Fisher Price Index instead of the Laspeyres Index that 
has traditionally been used.  Although Fisher indices have been used in the past in the 
housing literature, they have not been applied to estimate HPIs across time periods for 
spatial units individually as proposed here, but instead used to calculate HPIs to obtain 
cost of living proxies (Lopez & Aroca, 2012; Paredes, 2011; Paredes & Aroca, 2008).  
Although minor in nature, a second issue that the literature in HPIs has 
overlooked is the estimation of confidence intervals.  As in any calculation based on 
sample data, point estimates are reliable as long as enough observations are available and 
the underlying estimations are free of miss-specifications.  Since this is more likely to 
occur when using only a subsample of comparable sales and in the case of SSUs, this 
paper uses the delta method over the hedonic regression estimates to obtain standard 
errors and hence calculate confidence intervals for the proposed Fisher index.  In this 
fashion, the indices provided here indicate their deviation from other biased indices (such 
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a median prices commonly used in SSUs) and allow testing to reveal whether or not this 
deviation is significant. 
  In summary, the empirical strategy for the construction of housing price indices 
over comparable samples proposed in this paper involves three steps.  First, houses with 
similar characteristics across time are matched using quasi-experimental methods of 
control group or matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985).  This step contributes to 
widening the sample size (relative to the repeated sales methodology) and embracing the 
heterogeneity of housing market sales samples.  Secondly, hedonic regressions are 
estimated over the treated (t1) and control (t0) matched samples to obtain the shadow 
prices of housing characteristics.  Finally, the Fisher index is calculated using the price 
characteristics estimated in the previous step along with its corresponding confidence 
interval.  This three-step process is repeated for each SSU over time.  To exemplify the 
use of the technique, this paper estimates Fisher HPIs for all MSAs in the State of 
Illinois. 
In the case of MSAs in Illinois, the main results suggest that some smaller MSAs 
follow the trends in the Chicago MSA, while others exhibit trends that are different. The 
different trends found are summarized in four categories. The first type is formed by the 
“price decreasing” MSAs (Chicago and Rockford); and the second type is formed by the 
“price steady” MSAs (Champaign, Springfield, Decatur, Davenport and Peoria).  In 
addition to these two types of MSAs, a third one was discovered only when the matching 
approach is used – the “price mildly-decreasing” MSAs (Kankakee and St. Louis) that 
although they experienced decreases they were not as pronounced as those in Chicago 
and Rockford; and the “price increasing” MSA (Bloomington), which seems to be 
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always higher than the base prices.  The discovery of these two additional patterns in 
MSAs’ housing price behavior highlights the importance of controlling for housing 
characteristics in the construction of the samples to estimate housing price indices.  As an 
exercise to show the applicability of the methodology to the case of neighborhoods 
within larger metropolitan regions, the proposed HPI is estimated for the case of the 
community areas of Near North Side and Rosemont in the city of Chicago. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections.  The following section 
describes the methodology and each of the techniques used to calculate HPIs for smaller 
MSAs.  A description of the data and a discussion of the results are presented in the 
remaining sections.  The results section is focused on the analysis of the proposed Fisher 
HPIs in comparison to other measures at different levels of spatial (i.e. MSAs vs. 
Neighborhoods) and temporal (i.e. months vs. quarters) aggregation, as well as different 
quantiles. Results and potential implications of this paper are finally discussed in the 
concluding section. 
 
2.2. Methodology 
The first contribution in this paper lies in extending McMillen’s (2012) suggestions for 
using matching as a repeated sales estimator in Chicago to the case of SSUs, something 
that has not been considered in the previous US literature.  In particular and also 
acknowledging the contribution in Longford (2009), matching methods are used in this 
paper to create comparable data sets over time in terms of housing characteristics.  Once 
matching has been conducted, a data set for each spatial unit r with housing sales for the 
base period (t0) and the treated period (t1) is obtained and used to estimate Hedonic Price 
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Models (HPM).  Additionally, the estimated coefficients of each HPM are then used to 
estimate Fisher HPIs for each period of time.  These two methodological features are 
explained in detail in the following subsections. 
2.2.1 Matching 
Following Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985), the matching procedure can be broken down into 
several stages depending on the matching method.  As indicated in Paredes (2011), it is 
expected that the percentage of bias reduction will be higher in the cases when matching 
methods are based on minimizing the difference in housing characteristics (Mahalanobis 
distance matching) instead of minimizing the distance based on a single representation of 
the distribution (propensity score/kernel matching).  Also, it is expected that a matching 
method that has a poor level of bias reduction in larger samples (more data makes it 
easier to find a pair) will not have a better performance at smaller samples (where the 
number of observations decrease per time period).  In order to identify the matching 
method most suitable to our data, this paper uses the results from Lopez & Du (2014)  
that compares the matching quality of different methods at the annual level as a pre-filter 
to choose the method that best fits the data in terms of the percentage of bias reduction14 
from observable sources. In this context, the annual case method that delivered the 
highest percentage of bias reduction is the Mahalanobis matching with propensity score 
as calipers (MahalPSCal); this is used in this paper for higher frequency time 
frameworks such as monthly and quarterly15. 
																																																								
14 We follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)’s definition of percentage of bias reduction as the number of 
variables that have less than 10% on standardized difference between treated and control samples, respect 
to the total number of variables considered for matching. 
15 Potential hidden bias from unobserved variables affecting treatment assignment is assessed in Annex A, 
by estimating Rosenbaum Bounds. 
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General propensity-score-based matching follows a two-stage estimation procedure.  In 
the ﬁrst stage, the propensity score is estimated, using a binary discrete choice model 
such as:  
   (1) 
In the second stage, houses are matched on the basis of their predicted probabilities  
of participation, where .  In this paper, the following algorithm is used 
to construct the matched samples: 
1. For each treated period t1, a logit model is estimated using all sales taking place in 
the base period t0 and a future and treated period t1.  The dependent variable in the 
logit model then equals one if the sale took place in the treated period t1, and zero if 
the sale is from the base period t0.  The explanatory variables in the logit regressions 
are house attributes/characteristics, the same as those used for the hedonic price 
model estimations.  The fitted values of these regressions correspond to the 
propensity score (PS), providing a continuous metric of a house’s probability of 
belonging to the treated sample. 
2. The estimated PS from each logit regression is used to estimate a One-to-One PS-
based matching without replacement of N1 observations from a treated year period t1 
to sales N0 from the base period t0. Those observations that did not have a clone are 
dropped of the sample. This is a pre-filtering first matching stage. 
3. The second matching stage performs a Mahalanobis matching over the remaining 
data but additionally using the estimated propensity scores as calipers. A caliper is 
defined as a “window” to conduct the search for clones based on Mahalanobis 
distances.  As Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest, the caliper is defined as: 
q(x) ≡ log[1− e(x) / e(x)] =α + ′b f(x)
qˆ(x)
e(x) = Pr(x | z = t)
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, where , and the subscripts 1 and 0 denote treatment 
and control PS variances respectively. 
4. The resulting matched samples (treated and control) are later used to estimate the 
hedonic price models. 
  This general algorithm is applied for each treated sample t1={2, …, T} and the 
control sample t0={1} generating T-1 matched samples. The final output of this matching 
technique is sample data sets of comparable houses across time periods. It is worth noting 
that the sample sizes that this technique yields are much larger than if repeated sales 
would have been used, yet still delivering comparable houses and using more 
representative samples of the total of housing sales (only outliers are dropped). 
2.2.2 Hedonic Price Model (HPM) 
The hedonic approach considers the price of a good as the sum of the shadow or implicit 
prices of its characteristics or attributes (Rosen, 1974).  In the housing case, since only 
the total house sale price is observed, hedonic regressions explain housing prices as a 
function of house attributes, hence obtaining the shadow or implicit price of each housing 
characteristic.  
There are two features that vary in the literature when estimating HPM.  First, 
studies vary in the functional form they use, the most popular being the log-log and log-
linear specifications.  The choice has depended on the preference for interpreting 
marginal effects, where estimated coefficients are simply elasticities in the log-log 
context.  However, many other applications also use log-linear regressions since some of 
the independent variables include the zero value (such as in number of bedrooms where 
c = 0.2σ σ = [(σ12 +σ 02 ) / 2]0.5
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zero means a ‘studio-type’ apartment).  This paper uses a log-linear hedonic regression 
as: 
 
   (2) 
Where represents sale price for house i, is regression intercept,  is the 
estimated hedonic prices for a housing attribute k={1, 2, …, K} and is a vector 
variable a for housing attribute k.  Finally,  and are coefficients and vector variables 
for each of the l={1, 2, …, L} non-observed attributes, which are assumed to be 
controlled for due to the benefits of matching.  
The second feature of the HPM used in this paper involves estimation of a HPM 
for each period of time.  Subscripts t0 and t1 in (2) were used to specify this feature, 
which is considered appropriate because, estimating HPM for each time period does not 
assume that the coefficients of housing attributes are constant over time.  In this way, the 
estimated coefficients will capture changes in consumers’ valuation of housing attributes 
over time.  This is an important feature that needs to be included since time-varying 
factors such as the housing crisis, migration, urban renewal, among others, may change 
consumer preferences.  It is also important to note that the data used in this paper 
contains cross-sectional transactions pooled over time, where different housing attributes 
and prices are available at every period. 
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k X it0
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∑ + ε it0
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2.2.3 Fisher Housing Price Indices (Fisher-HPIs) 
An additional feature of this paper is the use of Fisher HPIs.  Although constructed from 
a Locally Weighted Regression (LWR), the use of Fisher indices is inspired by the work 
of Meese & Wallace (1991), who estimated HPIs for the each Municipality in the San 
Francisco/Bay Area.  More recently, the use of Fisher indices has also been applied to the 
case of Spatial HPIs (Paredes, 2011; Paredes & Aroca, 2008) in a single period of time, 
and for spatial and temporal calculations of this index (Lopez & Aroca, 2012).  
As pointed in Meese & Wallace (1991), the use of Fisher indices (also called 
Fisher Ideal Indices) has several advantages over other indices.  From Diewert's (1976) 
contribution, Fisher Ideal indices have been shown to be both superlative and exact, 
which are attractive properties when doing index construction since they allow direct 
comparison between indices and are derived from an underlying utility or production 
function.16  Additionally, Fisher indices reduce potential bias since they were calculated 
as the geometric mean (see (3)) between Laspeyres and Paasche Indices (Griliches, 
1961).  Specifically, the bias of using Laspeyres and Passche alone would underestimate 
and overestimate price indices respectively.  Equation (3) and figure 2.1 illustrate this 
point: 
   (3) 
Hence, from (3) and using algebraic manipulation the Fisher index can be derived as: 
  (4) 
																																																								
16  As pointed in Meese & Wallace (1991),  Rosen (1974) strongly argues that hedonic demand equations 
can be assumed to represent compensated demand functions if demander/buyers are assumed to be similar.  
P =
p1q1
p0q1
,     L =
p1q0
p0q0
,      F = P *L
lnF = 0.5 ln P⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + 0.5 ln L⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
       = 0.5 ln p1q1( )− ln p0q1( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + 0.5 ln p1q0( )− ln p0q0( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
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Where subscripts 1 and 0 denote treatment (t1) and control/base (t0) observations 
respectively. In (4), each component can be interpreted as:  
: House sale price based on attributes observed in t1 and valued at t1 prices. 
: House sale price based on attributes observed in t1 and valued at t0 prices. 
: House sale price based on attributes observed in t0 and valued at t1 prices. 
: House sale price based on attributes observed in t0 and valued at t0 prices. 
The components  and  correspond to and respectively, 
which are the mean of the observed house sale prices in each period.17  However, the 
components  and  need to be calculated from previous estimations of 
the hedonic regressions in (3) as: 
    (6) 
Then, replacing (5) in (6), we have: 
  (7) 
Finally, applying exponential function on both sides, we end up with: 
  (8) 
																																																								
17 This can be easily extended to any particular quantile instead of the mean, by simply estimating quantile 
regressions and using the predicted values for a particular quantile. This is portrayed in the results section. 
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Equation (8) is the expression used in this paper to estimate the Fisher price index for 
each treated time period t1={2, 3, …, T} relative to the base/control time period t0={1}. 
These estimations were applied for each SSU (r). 
As noted earlier, Fisher HPIs were calculated monthly and quarterly. The construction of 
both frequency samples through matching is illustrated in figure 2.2. These matched 
samples are later used to estimate hedonic regressions. 
2.3. Data 
The analysis was conducted using monthly housing sales data from January 2005 to 
August 2015 provided by the Illinois Association of Realtors (IAR).  The data contain 
cross-sectional housing sales’ transactions pooled over time, with housing attributes and 
prices are available at every period.  Information about home sales is available for the 
state of Illinois as a whole, allowing the estimation of the proposed HPIs at two levels of 
interest: 10 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), and neighborhoods within the City of 
Chicago. The main variables are listing price, closing price, as well as housing 
characteristics such as square footage, number of bedrooms and number of bathrooms.  
Although it is acknowledged that the spatial housing location is an important 
attribute explaining housing price, this paper has not included this variable in the MSAs’ 
estimations because it is not available for the whole 2005-2015 period, but only for 2005-
2012.  However, the Illinois Association of Realtors (IAR) has recently partnered with 
the 10K company that provides Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data for house sales with 
houses’ addresses starting in 2008.  Hence, this additional dataset allows completing the 
2005-2015 series for the case of the MSAs’ estimation, as well introducing spatial 
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location variables (distance to parks, hospitals and rail stations) into the neighborhood 
HPIs matching and hedonic estimations. 
Using the most recent classification for the MSAs in Illinois, the housing price 
data has been assembled for the 10 MSAs representing the most important urbanized 
areas in the state.  Figure 2.3.a shows the MSA classification by counties used in this 
paper.  In addition, table 2.1 presents basic descriptive statistics for the first month 
(control) and last month of available data.  Most variables have the expected number 
range with exception of some extreme values that were dropped after conducting the 
matching technique. Finally, figure 2.3.b shows two neighborhoods for the neighborhood 
HPI estimations. Near North Side and Roseland where chosen as an example of 
neighborhoods with different housing markets within the city of Chicago. 
 
2.4. Results 
Figure 2.4.a and 2.4.b show the main results of this paper, the estimation of the proposed 
Fisher HPI at the monthly and quarterly frequencies respectively for each of the MSAs in 
Illinois.  Note that each MSA’s housing market is relatively different from Chicago MSA 
market in their price behavior.  This comes to challenge the assumption that the biggest 
housing market in a region is a good proxy of the whole housing market.  A second 
distinctive feature of these figures is their confidence interval, which does not overlap in 
general with the Median-based index plotted in dotted lines.  This suggests that the use of 
Median-based indices – widely employed in SSUs such as small MSAs due to the lack of 
a better index, would provide in general a biased picture of the local housing markets.  As 
argued in the introduction, the proposed index is superior to Median-based indices 
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because it considers the price evolution for comparable houses only, discarding outliers 
and controlling for the change in consumer preferences.  Altogether, both figures provide 
clear evidence that housing markets at SSUs are different from the largest market and that 
is possible to have a more accurate measure of their behavior. 
 Figure 2.5.a and 2.5.b provide an alternative picture for the assessment of the 
differences in price evolution of the different MSAs in Illinois.  By joining the quarterly 
estimations in a single plot, it is easier to identify the different types of price behavior 
existent.  Figure 2.5.a shows the evolution of MSA Median-based HPI, which indicates 
the existence of three groups: a price decreasing type of MSA formed by Chicago and 
Rockford, characterized by a markedly downward trend; a price steady MSAs formed by 
Bloomington, Champaign, Davenport, St. Louis and Kankakee, which is characterized to 
have a more stable trend always dueling around the value of 1; and a price increasing 
MSAs formed by Springfield, Decatur, and Peoria, characterized by an upward trend that 
stays in most periods above 1.  
 In the same fashion, figure 2.5.b portrays the evolution of the proposed Fisher 
HPI confirming some of the patterns of the Median-based Index in figure 2.5.a, but also 
revealing new ones.  The first group in 5.2 is also formed by the price decreasing MSAs 
(Chicago and Rockford), which is expected due to the larger availability of housing sales 
and hence price indices (such as CS-HPI) to inform Chicago’s price behavior and 
because of the closeness of Rockford MSA to this market.  However, figure 2.5.b reveals 
a new group characterized by being price mildly-decreasing because they differ from the 
price steady as they decrease, but also do not decrease as much as Chicago and Rockford 
MSAs.  This new group of MSAs is formed by Kankakee and St. Louis, MSAs that were 
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misclassified in figure 2.5.a as price steady.  The price increasing MSAs also appear as 
being misclassified in figure 2.5.a, since now this group is formed only by Bloomington 
MSA, which is the only MSA that consistently has values above 1 in the entire period.  
Finally, Springfield, Decatur, and Peoria (previously classified as price-increasing) join 
the price-steady classification together with Champaign	and	Davenport MSAs. As a way 
to summarize these findings, figure 2.5.c plots the average of the Median-based Index 
versus the Fisher HPI for each MSA. This figure shows more clearly which MSAs on 
average had HPI bellow 1 in one index and above 1 on the other. Table 2.2 summarizes 
these results. 
The discovery of this new price-trend classification of the MSAs highlights the 
importance of controlling for housing characteristics in the construction of the samples to 
estimate HPIs in SSUs. Since Chicago accounts for two thirds of the Illinois housing 
market, one might have expected that either other MSAs would follow Chicago’s housing 
trends, or that Chicago would have unique housing trends.  However, the results suggest 
that only Rockford, Kankakee and St. Louis have similar decreasing behavior as with the 
Chicago MSA, leaving the rest of the Illinois MSAs in different types of housing markets 
(i.e. mildly-decreasing, steady and increasing). 
How can these results be explained?  One possible explanation could be a change 
in consumer preferences over time.  If this were the case, HPIs based on the median 
would not control for changes in preferences – i.e., consumers that previously 
preferred/bought bigger houses, might have changed to preferring/buying smaller ones, 
and hence comparing house prices with different house characteristics distributions will 
lead to less comparable samples.   
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Figures 2.6.a and 2.6.b support the previous hypothesis by highlighting the 
consumption differences across MSAs in terms of the percentage of sales by price 
brackets.  On the one hand, figure 2.6.a shows that Bloomington MSA had a highly stable 
market with a slight increase in sales for more expensive houses relative to previous 
years, consistent with the price-increasing pattern revealed by the proposed Fisher HPI.  
However, on the other hand, figure 2.6.b shows that the Chicago MSA had an abrupt shift 
in the consumption of cheaper houses during the housing crisis, which translates into very 
different housing characteristics being consumed in that period.  In summary, because the 
proposed matching method considers a fixed basket of reference (2005), these changes in 
consumer preferences are taken into account in the construction of the price index in 
contrast to the median price index that has no way to account for these changes. 
As a robustness check for the validity of the Fisher HPI, figure 2.7 compares the 
Median-based, the repeated-sales-based CS-HPI and the matching-based Fisher HPI for 
the case of the Chicago MSA.  As expected, the CS-HPI and the proposed Fisher HPI 
have very similar behavior, suggesting that the latter is as good as the former in 
monitoring the market.  However, it is important to note that the CS-HPI seems to be 
over-estimating in many periods – especially in the price-booming periods. This 
overestimation could be explained by two main sources of bias relative to the 
methodological weaknesses of the repeated sales (RS) approach.  First, there is an 
inherent selection bias imposed in the RS approach by only selecting those sales repeated 
and discarding the others.  Secondly, and as pointed out by (McMillen, 2012),  RS 
estimates are subject to bias if the explanatory variables for sales prices (i.e. housing 
attributes/characteristics) are not constant over time or if their coefficients change.  Both 
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of these sources of bias were highly likely to be exacerbated during the housing crisis, 
where different types of houses were being sold, some neighborhoods enjoyed higher 
appreciation rates than others, and extensive renovations were happening due to 
foreclosures. 
 Consistent with the expectation that there are different housing markets within the 
city of Chicago, figure 2.8 shows the estimations for two neighborhoods: Near North 
Side and Rosemont.  The former and the latter were chosen as representations of the 
higher and lower ends of the price distribution within the city respectively. As expected, 
the two neighborhoods show very different dynamics.  On the one hand, Near North Side 
appears to have suffered the effects of the housing crisis reaching its lowest levels at the 
end of 2011 with price-levels being 75% of those in 2008.  However, after 2011, this 
neighborhood shows signs of rapid recovery, reaching 2008 levels by the second quarter 
of 2014.  Contrarily, Rosemont shows that prices declined to below 50% of 2008 price-
levels, and have remained in this level until 2015. 
Finally, Figure 2.9 shows the results for all MSAs from quantile estimations of 
the proposed Fisher HPI. The idea here is to exemplify the flexibility of the Fisher Index 
to yield more accurate information not only because of the benefits from matching, but 
also because it allows tracking housing price behavior outside of the central tendency 
measures. Results show that in most cases quantiles capturing prices of the bottom part of 
the distribution result in HPIs also in the lower end.  
As it was expected, these differences become less evident for MSAs that have 
fewer observations and hence less variation in the distribution of housing prices. 
However, MSAs like Chicago, St. Louis, and Rockford show clear differences in the 
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estimated HPIs at different quantiles. This shows that even after controlling for housing 
characteristics there is a great variation of housing prices that remains hidden when only 
considering Mean or Median price indices. In particular, Chicago and Rockford show that 
although HPIs for all quantiles decreased after 2007, house prices above the percentile 75 
didn’t suffered as much as the lower end quantiles. Also, for the case of St Louis, it 
seems that while most quantile HPIs remained close to the pre-2007 prices, the lower 
quantiles (p10 and p25) suffered the most.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
Policy-makers commonly use HPIs as important indicators to measure and track the 
behavior of housing markets.  This paper contributes by bringing together different 
methodologies for estimating HPIs that were not available for smaller spatial units until 
now.  Since it has been argued that the nature of housing sales requires having HPIs that 
control for housing attributes and its potential variation over time, the HPIs estimated in 
this paper will potentially provide policy-makers of improved measures to tract the 
behavior of housing markets and take decisions accordingly including all spatial units and 
not only the largest ones. 
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that accurate HPIs can be 
made available for smaller spatial units (SSUs) such as MSAs within a state and 
neighborhoods within a city.  The proposed Fisher HPI is shown to be statistically 
different from the CS-HPI in the case of Chicago MSA, highlighting the well-known 
weaknesses of the repeated-sales methodology, especially in housing markets that have 
undergone deep changes (e.g. renovations, foreclosures, different rates of appreciations, 
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etc.) because of the housing crisis.  In the same fashion, the Fisher HPI shows statistically 
significant differences with the Median-based Indices (commonly used for the lack of a 
better index) for the case of smaller MSAs and neighborhoods.  
There are several additional benefits of having accurate information not only for 
the largest MSAs but also for smaller MSAs in a state. First, understanding the co-
movements between small and large MSAs in housing prices is important since it 
provides information about the potential influence of one on the other, providing a better 
interpretation of housing dynamics over time.  Additionally, since the cost of housing is a 
major component that is included in the cost of living, housing price indices are often 
used as a proxy measurement for the cost of living.  Therefore, providing housing price 
indices for smaller spatial levels (e.g., smaller MSAs) could be useful indicators to better 
understand regional disparities in costs of living both within a state and between states. 
Particular metrics that could be improved with the proposed Fisher HPI are affordability 
indices that currently consider Median-based HPIs. 
Several improvements could be considered to the methodology presented.  First, 
more spatial variables and models should be introduced in future versions of this index.  
This extension will enhance the accuracy of the estimations since it will capture the 
influence of spatial spillover effects of nearby houses (neighborhood effects) and 
amenities on house prices.  Secondly, the price indices provided here could be improved 
both by testing the dependency from the base period chosen.  
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2.6 FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Laspeyres and Paasche Price Indices Bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Monthly and Quarterly matching sample construction 
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Figure 2.3.a. MSA classification by county in Illinois 
 
    Source: Statistical Policy Office. United States Office of Management and Budget. 
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Figure 2.3.b. Near North Side and Roseland Neighborhoods in Chicago  
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Figure 2.4.a. Monthly Fisher HPI for 10 MSAs in Illinois
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Figure 2.4.b. Quarterly Fisher HPI for 10 MSAs in Illinois
 
MSA 1: Bloomington MSA 2: Champaign
MSA 3: Chicago MSA 4: Davenport
MSA 5: Decatur MSA 6: Kankakee
MSA 7: St. Louis MSA 8: Peoria
MSA 9: Rockford MSA 10: Springfield
1.0
1.2
1.4
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
0.8
1.0
1.2
0.9
1.1
1.3
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1 2
2005
3 4 1 2
2006
3 4 1 2
2007
3 4 1 2
2008
3 4 1 2
2009
3 4 1 2
2010
3 4 1 2
2011
3 4 1 2
2012
3 4 1 2
2013
3 4 1 2
2014
3 4 1 2
2015
3 1 2
2005
3 4 1 2
2006
3 4 1 2
2007
3 4 1 2
2008
3 4 1 2
2009
3 4 1 2
2010
3 4 1 2
2011
3 4 1 2
2012
3 4 1 2
2013
3 4 1 2
2014
3 4 1 2
2015
3
Median REAL HPI
 63 
Figure 2.5.a. Quarterly Median-based HPI for 10 MSAs in Illinois 
 
 
Figure 2.5.b. Quarterly Fisher HPI for 10 MSAs in Illinois 
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Figure 2.5.c. Median vs. Fisher HPI in averages of the 2005-2015 HPIs
 
Figure 2.6.a. Bloomington MSA Housing Sales Price Stratification
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Figure 2.6.b. Chicago MSA Housing Sales Price Stratification 
 
Figure 2.7. Three Indices of Chicago MSA: Fisher HPI, Case-Schiller HPI (Repeat 
Sales) and Median-based HPI
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Figure 2.8. Quarterly Fisher HPI for the neighborhoods Near North Side and Roseland 
in Chicago
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Figure 2.9. Quarterly Fisher HPI for 10 MSAs in Illinois by selected quantiles
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2.7 TABLES 
Table 2.1. Basic Summary Statistics of the used Data 
  
2005:q1 2015:q1 
MSA Stat. Bed Bath Sold Price Sq. Feet Bed Bath Sold Price Sq. Feet 
MSA 1: 
Bloomington 
Mean 3.30 2.42  156,190  1994.62 3.45 2.08  172,658  2238.08 
Min 1 1  18,079  541 1 1  15,000  624 
Max 6 5  950,000  7319 6 5  631,365  6726 
N 370 370  370  370 424 424  424  424 
MSA 2: 
Champaign 
Mean 3.18 1.71  145,379  1722.16 3.26 1.88  154,288  1753.37 
Min 1 1  4,828  480 1 1  2,600  400 
Max 5 4  560,000  5817 6 5  820,000  5347 
N 438 438  438  438 463 463  463  463 
MSA 3: 
Chicago 
Mean 2.66 1.82  322,411  1753.36 2.98 1.87  242,934  1758.08 
Min 0 1  6,500  1 0 0  1  1 
Max 9 7  5,135,245  11000 7 7  4,500,000  12000 
N 8,179  8,179   8,179  8,179  14,572  14,572  14,572  14,572  
MSA 4: 
Davenport 
Mean 2.83 1.21  94,871  1390.56 2.98 1.33  102,884  1446.62 
Min 1 1  3,000  465 1 1  1,900  597 
Max 5 3  505,000  7650 6 2  630,000  4076 
N 453 453  453  453 398 6  398  398 
MSA 5: 
Decatur 
Mean 2.86 1.78  79,191  1470.29 3.10 1.00  97,917  1832.37 
Min 1 1  2,000  633 1 1  2,500  672 
Max 7 6  342,500  5540 6 1  900,000  11232 
N 300 300  300  300 226 1  226  226 
MSA 6: 
Kankakee 
Mean 3.02 1.76  124,653  1494.05 3.15 1.64  116,896  1645.63 
Min 1 1  7,500  530 1 1  8,000  705 
Max 6 5  438,000  4118 5 5  481,500  4560 
N 254 254  254  254 181 180  181  181 
MSA 7: St. 
Louis 
Mean 2.96 1.95  124,255  1699.78 3.06 2.40  132,088  1915.63 
Min 1 1  2,000  450 1 2  500  480 
Max 7 5  690,000  5773 6 3  900,000  7218 
N 1,489  1,489  1,489  1,489  1,422  5  1,422  1,422  
MSA 8: 
Peoria 
Mean 2.98 1.43  120,888  1531.96 3.09 1.76  139,270  1624.73 
Min 1 1  5,000  504 1 0  4,500  520 
Max 5 5  890,000  5501 7 6  2,000,000  8082 
N 1,073  1,073   1,073   1,073   723   723   723   723  
MSA 9: 
Rockford 
Mean 3.24 1.81  161,835  1786.19 3.03 1.72  92,371  1596.75 
Min 2 1  26,000  900 1 1  575  520 
Max 5 4  925,000  6000 6 5  610,000  4639 
N 140 140  140  140 890 890  890  890 
MSA 10: 
Springfield 
Mean 2.94 1.75  115,955  1770.55 3.10 1.83  145,695  2006.88 
Min 1 1  5,000  450 1 1  4,000  680 
Max 6 4  950,000  8933 6 2  600,000  9044 
N 599 599  599  599 493 6  493  493 
Note: Unfortunately, some MSAs have missing Bathroom data after 2012 explaining the differences in N. 
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Table 2.2. Illinois MSA Price Trend Classification by HPI 
 
Price Trend Median-based HPI Fisher HPI 
Increasing Springfield 
Decatur  
Peoria 
Bloomington 
Steady Bloomington 
Champaign 
Davenport 
St. Louis 
Kankakee 
Champaign 
Davenport  
Springfield 
Decatur 
Peoria 
Decreasing Chicago 
Rockford 
Chicago 
Rockford 
Mildly-Decreasing –  Kankakee  
St. Louis 	
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2.9 Annex: Assessing a potential hidden bias in the matching of houses 
As a way to assess potential hidden biases from unobservable sources, Rosenbaum bounds were 
calculated as proposed in (Rosenbaum, 2002). The idea is to test if there is a potential 
unobserved variable affecting the odds of an observation to be assigned to the treated group 
rather than the control group. Given that treatment in this study is defined by time (i.e. a house 
sale is considered treated as long as it was sold after t =1), the presence of hidden biases would 
imply considering an unobserved variable that would potentially affect the odds of a house to be 
sold in the future (treated period) rather than in the base (control) period. Such implication is 
plausible in the case when a rational house owner change¬s the time the house is sold because it 
envisions a way to maximize her profit, which is here unobserved. In this context the Rosenbaum 
bounds calculate the likelihood level necessary for the treatment assignment to be potentially 
affected by an unobserved variable rather than the treatment of time alone.  
The results of this sensitivity analysis generally indicate that the null hypothesis of no effect of 
time in the variation of price houses becomes plausible for values of Γ >=2.4 for large MSAs like 
Chicago, and Γ >=1.2 for smaller MSAs like Champaign. In other words, to attribute the price 
differences between treatment and control to an unobserved variable, this variable would need to 
increase the odds of a future sale in 2.4 times and 1.2 times for large and small MSAs 
respectively. In sum, these results indicate that the matching outcome could be sensitive to 
unobserved variables. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show examples of results of the Rosenbaum bounds for 
Chicago and Bloomington MSAs.  
Although the results of the sensitivity analysis to hidden bias are positive, it is likely that they are 
due to factors other than the actual presence of an unobserved variable affecting the assignment 
into treatment for several reasons. First, given that matching between houses is carried out 
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between the base period (control) and posterior (treatment) periods with t > 1, it is reasonable to 
expect a potential hidden bias of an unobserved variable for matching between the initial periods 
with the base rather than later periods. In other words, it is unreasonable to think that households 
could hold selling a house for too many periods afterwards rather than sell it in the base period. 
(Carrillo & Pope, 2012) provides support for this argument by pointing that estimated hazard 
functions on the time of sale from the listing date converge to a likelihood of zero (absolute 
certainty of a sale) after 3 to 6 months.  
Second, these results are expected given that the data available is incomplete in order to capture 
other variables causing the differences between treatment and control-matched samples. 
Particularly, given that the matching estimations at the MSA level lack geographical coordinates, 
it is expected that there would be a problem of omitted variable. However, econometrically 
speaking this problem is expected to affect the precision of regression coefficients rather than be 
associated with an unobserved variable measuring the likelihood of households waiting to sell 
houses in latter periods. A sign that supports this explanation is that when larger samples are 
available (hence increasing the chances of a better match), the results become less sensitive to 
potential hidden bias. 
Even though this study lacks of data to properly test the aforementioned hypothesis, two 
additional exercises were included in the construction of the HPIs in order to reduce the potential 
hidden bias. First, the number of days a house was being offered in the market is used as another 
covariate to control for the potential hidden bias. Since the listing and closing dates are available 
in the data, it is straightforward to calculate this variable. In fact, for the case of Chicago, when 
this variable is included in the matching process, the results become less sensible. Second, 
quarterly estimations are also included expecting that since sales are now grouped in longer 
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periods of time (3 months), this will not only capture better housing market dynamics as 
suggested in (McMillen, 2012), but also would allow to reduce potential misclassification of 
sales as treated due to an unobserved variable. 
 
Table 2.3 Rosenbaum Bounds Significant Levels for Chicago MSA selected periods 
  2005.q2 2010.q2 2015.q2 
Γ Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
1 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
1.2 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
1.4 0 0.0013 0 0.0 0 0 
1.6 0 0.9825 0 0.0257 0 0 
1.8 0 1 0 0.9932 0 0.0002 
2 0 1 0 1 0 0.6110 
2.2 0 1 0 1 0 0.9999 
2.4 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2.6 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2.8 0 1 0 1 0 1 
3 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Number of 
matched pairs 
8179 8024 8015 
 
Table 2.4 Rosenbaum Bounds Significant Levels for Bloomington MSA selected periods 
  2005.q2 2010.q2 2015.q2 
Γ Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
1 0.0430 0.0430 0 0 0.0014 0.0014 
1.2 0.0006 0.4197 0 0 0 0.0469 
1.4 0 0.8590 0 0 0 0.2808 
1.6 0 0.9857 0 0 0 0.6427 
1.8 0 0.9993 0 0.0003 0 0.8852 
2 0 1 0 0.0038 0 0.9745 
2.2 0 1 0 0.0241 0 0.9958 
2.4 0 1 0 0.0894 0 0.9995 
2.6 0 1 0 0.2217 0 0.9999 
2.8 0 1 0 0.4082 0 1 
3 0 1 0 0.6045 0 1 
Number of 
matched pairs 
370 362 279 
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CHAPTER 3: AN EX-ANTE ANALYSIS OF HOUSING LOCATION CHOICES DUE TO 
HOUSING DISPLACEMENT: THE CASE OF BRISTOL PLACE18 
 
Abstract: 
Urban renewal has been criticized for its unintended effects on the displacement of residents to 
housing situations where they are worse off. The literature concerned with housing displacement 
focuses on after the fact (ex post) analysis of mobility, hence providing only partial insights to 
prospective outcomes for residents.  In this article, we develop a methodology for predicting 
before the fact (ex ante) spatial location outcomes for residents facing forced displacement. We 
ask where in the city will displaced residents locate and how do potential new locations compare 
to the current one? We apply this methodology to an ongoing urban renewal project in Illinois in 
order to predict spatial relocation patterns. Our findings show that residents facing forced 
displacement are likely to relocate to low-priced neighborhoods that are on average as bad or 
worse off in terms of housing adequacy, accessibility to labor, and shopping. These findings not 
only bear important implications for urban redevelopment policy, but also help to reveal spatially 
determined costs of moving which are not factored into current redevelopment impact 
evaluations.  																																																								
18 Co-authored with Andrew Greenlee, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign. Reprinted, with permission from: Lopez, E. & Greenlee, A. (2016)  “An Ex-Ante Analysis Of 
Housing Location Choices Due To Housing Displacement: The Case Of Bristol Place”. Applied Geography, Vol. 
75, October 2016, Pages 156–175. The authors are thankful to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and 
the College of Fine and Applied Arts for funding a portion of this work. Any opinions, findings and conclusions are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Illinois. The authors would like to 
thank to Leonardo Bonilla, Kathy Baylis, Edward Feser, Geoffrey Hewings and the members of the Regional 
Economics Applications Laboratory for their useful comments and suggestions in previous versions of this paper. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Residential mobility has been of great concern of housing researchers due to its importance in 
shaping not only how households behave in relation to their built environment, but also due to 
spatial dimensions of change in terms of regional demographics and determinants of inequality. 
From the early days of research on determinants of residential location choice (Rossi, 1955; 
Tiebout, 1956), a considerable amount of literature describes both household-level and 
neighborhood-level patterns of mobility due to life cycles and housing career changes (Clark & 
Dieleman, 1996) – under what we might classify as ordinary circumstances. Scholarship on 
forced housing displacement is less common, particularly outside of an evaluative context, with 
the majority of that literature focusing on special circumstances such as the demolition of public 
housing (Joseph and Chaskin, 2012; Chaskin, et al., 2012) and the deconcentration of poverty 
(Rubinovitz and Rosembaum, 2002; Sampson, 2008; Sanbonmatsu, et al., 2012; Rosenbaum et 
al., 2002; Rosembaum, et al., 2005).  Outside of these special circumstances, we know very little 
about the spatial outcomes of residential mobility resulting from non-elective housing 
displacement.  
 The housing displacement literature can be subdivided in two groups that are 
differentiated by what causes displacement. The first branch is concerned with displacement 
caused by natural disasters that, due to the tragedy and urgency of this type of phenomenon, 
relatively more research has been added to the literature.19 The second branch however, looks at 
the case where the source of displacement comes from government or market action, and is 
related largely within processes of redevelopment and urban renewal. This branch is focused on 
ex post analysis of displaced households compared to their previous situations. In particular, ex 																																																								
19 See Belcher & Bates, (1983), Gray & Mueller (2012), Morrow Jones & Morrow Jones (1991) for an initial 
reading on this matter. 
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post analyses provide an important means of assessing the financial, spatial, and socioeconomic 
impacts of redevelopment processes.  
Although more complete in the information they provide, ex post analysis of housing 
displacement provides only one way of addressing its different consequences: that of looking for 
either a remedial solution and/or aiming to inform so the unintended effects are not repeated. If 
one wants to prevent and minimize the unintended consequences of housing displacement – such 
as housing inadequacy, job loss, lack of accessibility, etc. (Newman & Owen, 1982; Atkinson, 
2000) – ex ante analysis must be performed in order to shed light of potential threats to urban 
renewal plans.  The main advantage of ex ante analyses is their inexpensive nature compared to 
the high costs of dealing with unintended consequences. 
In the U.S., in the rare situation that analysis of displacement does occur, ex ante analyses 
are usually limited in their nature since it is a resource (data and modeling) intensive endeavor to 
forecast where future displacees will relocate and how their socio-economic situation would 
change. As a result, these evaluations mostly focus only monetary compensation to make up for 
the cost of housing loss (as required by the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations in circumstances 
where Federal dollars are involved in the project, and often compelled as a function of takings 
provisions of procedural due process), completely disregarding other distress situations that 
future displacees have to face  (the housing and neighborhood search, accessibility to job 
markets and social and educational services, among others).  
In this article, we present a methodological framework for predicting the spatial 
outcomes of forced displacement, under the notion that an ex ante analysis has the potential to 
help inform the design and implementation of relocation efforts.  Our approach involves two 
primary methodological objectives: 1) forecasting the specific dwelling that future displacees are 
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most likely to choose; and 2) evaluating the spatial outcome of this prediction in terms of 
housing adequacy, affordability, access to amenities and labor markets, among others. Our 
approach illustrates the value of this analysis for both empirical investigation but also for policy 
analysis and public accountability.  
We confront two primary issues that have constrained ex ante analysis in the past: data 
constraints and the lack of a counterfactual. Data constraints are dealt with using a novel source 
of longitudinal household location data. The second problem, namely the lack of a 
counterfactual, is a common problem in ex ante studies since there is no way to contrast potential 
outcomes of a treatment that has not yet occurred. To address this issue, we use bootstrapping 
(i.e. randomly drawn samples of data over which the proposed model is re-estimated) to provide 
margin of errors. We apply this approach to an ongoing urban renewal process occurring in the 
Bristol Place neighborhood in Champaign, Illinois.  
 After conducting an exploratory analysis (Annex 3.A), we first estimate discrete choice 
models of residential mobility and location choice over a city-level sample, capturing the 
dynamics and mobility patterns in regular conditions. We then use these models to estimate the 
most likely residential location choices for households facing displacement, with a focus on the 
spatial and demographic relocation outcomes for displaced households.   
Initial results suggest that our discrete choice mobility model conforms to theoretical 
principles of lifecycle and housing career models of mobility: household are more likely to move 
when they are younger, have less income, live in apartments, rent their dwelling, and households 
are smaller in size. However, in looking at Bristol Place movers who are facing forced 
displacement, neighborhood residents have a lower probability of changing residency. This 
implies that in a general setting, these households would not move, underscoring the involuntary 
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character of the mobility that they face. Our models predict that Bristol Place residents will 
potentially move to neighborhoods with a greater share of rental housing stock, placing them into 
heightened competition with other local populations including over 43,000 university students. 
This has clear implications since displacement could be understood as the causal factor forcing 
residents to demand housing in a more competitive market. 
The following section reviews the literature situating the current paper and its 
contributions. Next the case of Bristol Place is described emphasizing the conditions and 
timeline of the future displacees. Then we discuss the proposed method and why this is the best 
way to predict household’s potential outcomes in terms of housing location and accessibility. 
Next we describe the data, its sources and limitations. Finally we present the results and discuss 
their implications to policy making. 
 
3.2. Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
3.2.1 Categorizations of Residential Mobility 
The study of residential mobility and household location has been characterized by a tremendous 
amount of research looking at voluntary moves of households as a result of changing conditions 
in housing needs and life situations.  As Clark & Dieleman (1996) point out, much of this 
literature operates under the assumption that “the reason for the move is to match household 
needs to housing characteristics”. Since household needs are expected to change with time, so 
too will housing and location preferences (Kan, 1999). Voluntary-expected moves are those 
accounting for the majority of residential mobility, and tend to be largely predicted by age, 
socio-economic status, space needs and housing tenure (Clark & Van Lierop, 1987; Dieleman, 
2001; Kan, 1999). 
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In contrast, voluntary-unexpected moves are associated with sudden changes in the 
variables also affecting expected moves, however then household cannot foresee those changes. 
Examples could include job relocation, sudden illness, etc. 
Involuntary-unexpected moves arise when households can neither foresee nor have the 
choice to decide between moving or not. Displacement due to natural disasters is a common 
example for this kind of move, given their tendency to result in long-term and even permanent 
residential displacement (Morrow-Jones & Morrow-Jones, 1991). Finally, involuntary-expected 
moves are those that, although the household is forced to move, it is still able to foresee and 
possibly plan for it. Urban renewal that leads to displacement is an example of involuntary-
expected moves, since households typically receive notification that they will have to move and 
are given lead time to relocate. Other examples of involuntary-expected moves include 
relocation because of foreclosure processes and depressed neighborhoods due to crime or 
violence (Engel & Ibáñez, 2007). 
3.2.2 Studies in Residential Mobility and Housing Displacement 
Most of the types of residential mobility previously discussed have been widely researched. In 
the voluntary movements category, voluntary-expected moves account for the majority of the 
available literature providing a good characterization of the variables and type of households that 
most usually move, as well as the type of location they choose depending on household 
characteristics (Phipps, 1982; Speare, 1974; Onaka & Clark, 1983; Pickles & Davies, 1985; 
Dieleman, 2001). Three major review articles summarize the literature on voluntary residential 
mobility. The first two were reviews summarized theoretical aspects (Straszhem, 1987) and the 
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major empirical studies of mobility (Clark & Van Lierop, 1987). Brasington (2013) provides the 
latest review, which examines the latest trends on applications and methods. 
 Residential location choice has also been examined in terms of housing tenure choice, 
which explores households’ decisions to rent or own a particular dwelling after moving. Davies 
& Crouchley (1984), Ioannides, (1987), Ioannides & Kan (1996) are examples of papers looking 
at the influence of life cycle factors upon how households strategically invest in housing. This 
work finds that the own/rent price ratio and the age of the household are major determining 
factors.  
An additional body of literature has engaged with residential location choice as a function 
of gentrification and neighborhood change. Researchers have examined how changes in 
preferences and social distances between the resident and its neighborhood influence location 
choices (Musterd, van Gent, Das, & Latten, 2014); have examined the influx of wealthier 
residents to existing neighborhoods (Freeman, 2005); and have examined in detail the factors 
leading to gentrification (Atkinson, 2000a; Millard-Ball, 2002). Perhaps the most compelling 
argument that has explored the links between gentrification, abandonment and displacement can 
be found in Marcuse (1985). In this paper, displacement is explained as a product of market 
forces that would occur either as a product of newcomers with higher socio-economic status (i.e. 
gentrification), or as the product of landlord neglect, compelling tenants to leave due to poor 
conditions of their dwellings.  
The intrinsic nature of involuntary movements presents some unique challenges for 
studying associated mobility phenomena. Involuntary displacement is oftentimes unanticipated, 
or there is not an institutional context or rationale for data collection or mitigation (gentrification 
or abandonment). In the few cases where displacees were identified and followed, the literature 
 81 
focuses on evaluating displacement outcomes by contrasting households’ pre and post 
displacement situations, hence providing an ex post analysis of their situation. In this category 
there is mixed evidence pointing both to positive (Newman & Owen, 1982; Kleinhans, 2010) and 
negative (Atkinson, 2000b) outcomes of displacement. One of most complete ex post 
assessments on the location choices of displacees in the US is found in Kleit & Galvez (2011).  
This article finds that the main factors explaining location outcomes are related to 
neighborhood characteristics, distance from the previous housing, along with personal and 
market characteristics. Finally, the authors reveal that social networks are a defining 
characteristic explaining the ability of households to move to neighborhoods with less poverty. 
Although it has been an elusive task, these articles show that understanding the outcomes of 
involuntary displacement has been an important task because of the socio-economic burden it 
poses into displacees. 
To our best knowledge, there are no published articles that look at housing displacement 
from an ex ante perspective, constituting a gap in the literature that demands to be addressed. 
Having an ex ante analysis is an important contribution for several reasons. First, current ex ante 
analysis in urban renewal projects normally only take into account basic costs and incomplete 
measures to determine compensation plans for affected households. This paper argues that 
providing a way to estimate probabilities to move and potential location choices prior to 
displacement will help planners in charge of the design of compensation and relocation 
counseling programs. Second, and as pointed by Dieleman (2001), the fact that households are 
incapable of accurately predicting their future satisfaction of a dwelling chosen in regular 
conditions could be exacerbated when the household is forced to move, raising even more 
uncertainty and potential for dissatisfaction with the housing choice. 
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3.3. Bristol Place Urban Renewal 
The Bristol Place neighborhood is situated in Champaign’s “North End” (Figure 3.1), an area 
that accounts for 11.84 percent of the city’s population, but 38.55 percent of the city’s African-
American population (2014 American Community Survey 5-year estimates). The Bristol Place 
neighborhood, which we focus on in our analysis, constitutes a portion of the North End. Table 
3.1 shows a comparison of different demographic measures between Bristol Place and the cities 
of Champaign and Urbana, underscoring the relative demographic and structural disadvantage 
reflected in comparatively high poverty rates, low home values, and low rental prices. 
The structural disadvantage faced by the neighborhood has long been an object of city 
concern (Prochaska, 2015). Planning for the Bristol Place neighborhood was initiated in 2007, 
when Champaign’s City Council adopted as part of its 2007-2012 Vision + Goals statement a 
goal to develop a redevelopment plan for the Bristol Place neighborhood. Following the adoption 
of this vision and goals statement, the city produced a series of overlapping neighborhood 
assessments through the city’s neighborhood wellness planning process as well as a specific 
Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan20 (City of Champaign, 2011).  
In May 2012 the City of Champaign laid out a neighborhood renewal strategy involving 
the acquisition, relocation and clearance of the neighborhood. The city has budgeted $7.7 million 
dollars for the acquisition and demolition of all properties within the neighborhood. Funding for 
the plan comes from HUD Urban Renewal funds, a Section 108 loan, HOME funds, CDBG 
funds, and an in-kind donation from the Housing Authority of Champaign County. The plan is 
subject to antidisplacement protections under Section 104(d) of the Housing and Community 
Development Act as well as the Uniform Relocation Act. In 2012, a neighborhood household 																																																								
20 All documentation can be found at: http://ci.champaign.il.us/departments/neighborhood-services/neighborhood-
programs/community-development-projects/draft-bristol-place-redevelopment-master-plan/ 
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survey was conducted to help to identify relocation needs (Greenlee and Tutt, 2012). Of the 69 
occupied housing units in the portion of the neighborhood slated for demolition, 62 percent of 
households (43 households) responded to the survey. For renters, the average length of stay at 
current residence was 3.75 years, and for owners average length of stay was 27.75 years, 
reflecting a market consisting of a relatively transitory renter population and a largely stable (but 
ageing) group of homeowners (Table 3.3).  
The majority of residents (53%) indicated a desire to return to the community following 
redevelopment (Table 3.4), although individual conversations with residents revealed a high 
level of uncertainty regarding whether the neighborhood would be affordable following 
redevelopment. Owners and renters reported mixed desires regarding a preference for returning 
to the neighborhood with the intent of owning or renting (Table 3.5).  
The findings from this survey and other community conversations raise concerns 
regarding resident relocation and return to the neighborhood. Given an estimated 3-5 year 
demolition, acquisition, and redevelopment process, and no legally guaranteed right to return, 
will residents view relocation moves as temporary or permanent? Relocation counseling 
provided under the city’s Replacement Housing and Relocation Assistance Plan (City of 
Champaign, 2012) provides guidance regarding how to approach this question, however, there is 
little clarity regarding the prospective long-term outcomes for residents.  
 
3.4. Research Design and Method 
3.4.1 Ex ante research design 
The literature on program evaluation suggests that ex ante analysis provides several 
complementary advantages to ex post assessments (Todd & Wolpin, 2008). Table 3.2 
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summarizes the purpose, advantages and disadvantages of each approach, highlighting that ex 
ante analysis is a crucial part of any program evaluation since it provides useful information to 
design the program itself, predict potential outcomes and even correct a course of action saving 
resources and reducing risks (Leite, Narayan, & Skoufias, 2011). 
Often, ex ante analysis are based on the estimation of behavioral models that are used as 
a baseline scenario for future predictions (Pagliara, Preston, & Simmonds, 2010). Once the 
baseline model has been estimated (and in some occasions calibrated), it can be re-estimated 
with new information allowing the evaluation of specific outcomes by changing the values of 
relevant variables so they can fit potential situations of interest. In the case of residential mobility 
and location choice, potential displacement outcomes can be evaluated by first estimating a 
baseline model using available mobility data, and then using the baseline model’s coefficients to 
calculate the probability to choose a particular housing unit using the household, dwelling and 
neighborhood characteristics of those to be displaced. 
These models can be validated in different ways. One option is using another treatment 
(e.g. foreclosures, teardowns or other displacement situations) that occurred in the past within the 
same context. Another common option is to evaluate how the proposed model performs in 
another context where pre and post treatment data is available. A third option entails simulating 
the whole data (as if one would know everything there is to know) and evaluate the model 
performance to forecast the artificially imposed outcomes. A fourth option is to use 
bootstrapping methods to re-estimate the model based on randomly drawn samples of data, hence 
getting an empirical distribution of estimated parameters instead of a single estimate. Each of 
these options has their own advantages and disadvantages, and the choice of what validation 
method is applied usually depends on availability of data and resources. In our case and given 
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data constraints, we use bootstrapping as a way to provide validation for our estimations by 
adding margin of errors. 
3.4.2 Two Models for Residential Mobility and Location Choice 
Discrete choice models have served as the main tool for analyzing behavioral decisions of 
economic agents. The pioneering work of McFadden (1977) opened up the theoretical and 
modeling approaches of residential mobility and location choice, linking them with the random 
utility framework by allowing to put households’ choices in terms of economic valuation of their 
available alternatives. Other studies have introduced new variations and special cases, creating a 
great body of literature (for a non-exhaustive list of this please refer to Clark & Van Lierop 
(1987), Heaton, Fredrickson, Fuguitt, & Zuiches, (1979), Onaka & Clark (1983), Phipps (1982), 
Straszhem, (1987)). 
 More recent advances on the modeling of residential mobility and location choice include 
a variety of new improvements often accompanied by the availability of new data and 
computational power. Among some of them are the treatment of dynamic discrete choice 
modeling that includes adaptive behavior (Fischer & Nijkamp, 1987; Kan, 2000), the inclusion 
of expectations as determining factors constraining the decision process of those unexpected 
moves (Kan, 1999) that could eventually lead to inaccurate predictions and irrational decision 
making (Dieleman, 2001), the treatment of endogeneity (Guevara & Ben-Akiva, 2007) and space 
(Bhat & Guo, 2004), as well as more specific issues such as the problem of numerous 
alternatives from where alternative sampling methods have been proposed (Lee & Waddell, 
2010). A recent review of the most common issues and situations on the modeling of residential 
mobility and location choice can be found in Bruch & Mare (2012). 
 As mentioned in the introduction, an exploratory analysis of the variables of interest is 
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conducted as a way to understand the data and check if basic regularities of residential mobility 
processes arise (i.e. life cycles and housing careers). This is important as a pre-filtering stage to 
select variables that will later enter the discrete choice models. Then and following Bruch & 
Mare (2012) and Lee & Waddell (2010), we estimate two independent discrete choice models to 
characterize the decision sequence of residential mobility (move or stay) and location choice 
(move to which dwelling unit?) in non-displacement conditions. Although this can be done 
simultaneously with a single nested logit formulation as in Lee & Waddell (2010), this paper 
treats the mobility decision sequence as two separate processes for two reasons: first, this allows 
for exploratory analysis of the two stages; and second, because potential displacees are forced to 
move, the choice between  moving or staying is taken away from them, hence reducing the 
problem to a location choice decision only21. 
3.4.2.1 Residential Mobility 
Using the random utility framework (McFadden, 1977; Onaka & Clark, 1983), the first model of 
residential mobility contemplates a household facing the choice between moving or staying. This 
household considers a set of attributes to evaluate the different alternatives available and 
choosing the one with the highest level of utility. This evaluation is represented bellow as 
Prnm = Pr(Unm > Uns) = Pr(Unm – Uns > 0) 
where Prnm is the probability of a household n to move, and Unm and Uns are the utility levels to 
move (m) or stay (s) respectively. Since the researcher only observes a portion of the utility Vnm 
and Vns, the equation above can be re-written as 
Prnm = Pr(Vnm + εnm > Vns + εns) = Pr(Vnm – Vns >  εns – εnm) 
Prns = Pr(Vns + εns > Vnm + εnm) = Pr(Vns – Vnm >  εnm – εns) 																																																								
21 Because the probability to move equals 1 in the case of forced displacement, the inclusive value in a nested 
formulation is constrained to 1 for both cases, the move and stay upper levels. 
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where εnm and εns represent the unobserved part of the utility between moving and staying 
respectively. Then, considering that households evaluate a set of variables that are observed to 
the researcher and represented in Xn and assuming the unobserved part of the utility is iid 
extreme value for all n, the overall probability of moving conditional to those control variables 
can be written as 
Prnm = expVnm / (expVnm + expVns) = expβ´Xnm / (expβ´Xnm + expβ´Xns)       (1) 
which is the well-known Logit model for the bivariate case. 
3.4.2.2 Location Choice  
Once the residential mobility module has been estimated, a location choice model is estimated. 
Assuming that the decision between moving and staying is irrelevant in the case of displacees, 
the location choice model is restricted to all households that moved in a period t. Because the 
total number of available alternatives (housing units) is large and unrealistic for a household to 
consider them all, we employ a random strategy for the selection of alternatives. In this context, 
the first location (l1) is always the actual choice (i.e. the new residence of the moving household) 
and alternatives l2 to lL are randomly sampled from the available housing stock C at the time. 
Figure 3.2 portrays this choice design. 
 Given the assumed decision structure, we estimate a Multinomial Logit Model (MNLM) 
following Waddell (2003, 2010). This model also follows the random utility framework where 
Unlt= Vnlt + εnlt is the utility of a household n from choosing a housing location l, with its 
respective observed and unobserved parts. By applying random sampling over alternatives from 
the whole set C of available housing units the standard multinomial choice model to estimate is 
Prnlt = expVnlt / (Σj=1:L expVnjt ) = expβt´Xnlt / (Σj=1:L expβt´Xnjt)          (2) 
Same as in equation 1, the observed utility (Vnlt) is characterized with the observed variables that 
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will explain the choice of a housing location l at time t. This requires observing the actual choice 
(l1) and the potential alternatives that each individual had at the time of choosing. Hence, the 
model in equation 2 is estimated in each period of time t ={1, …, T} available. 
3.4.2.3. Predicting Future Housing Location Choices 
Later and once there is an idea of the stability of the estimated coefficients in each period, the 
MNLM coefficients from the last period available are selected as a baseline for forecasting the 
future period T+1 in order to predict the potential location choices of future displacees. This 
assumes that the estimated coefficients (βT) are a good proxy for future displacees choices. In 
other words, because in a future period only the available housing stock CT+1 is observed, but no 
their actual choices, the estimated coefficients (βT) from the last period (T) are used to predict 
potential locations in T+1. Random sampling of alternatives from the housing stock CT+1 is also 
used here, where now l1 to lL are randomly sampled. 
With the estimated coefficients (βT) and the randomly assigned alternatives observed 
from CT+1 the observed utility Vnlt can be estimated for each household expecting to move in T+1 
by 
Vnlt = βT´Xnlt, for all l= {1, …, L} and t = T+1    (3) 
Calculating equation 3 over the set of random alternatives provides the utility that each of 
those alternatives will yield to a future displaced household hd. The probability of choice 
associated with the observed utility (Vnlt) of each alternative is estimated by using the logit 
formula in equation 2. 
3.4.2.4. Market clearing process 
Following Waddell (2010), a first-come-first-served allocation algorithm is set in place to assign 
particular housing units to households. Because each household has an estimated probability to 
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each of its L random sampled alternatives from CT+1, a household h will be assigned a location l 
if it has the highest estimated probability to choose that alternative. In other words, the CT+1 
alternatives are ranked by the highest estimated probability and assigned to the corresponding 
household h. This process is repeated until the market has been cleared, that is until all 
households have been assigned a location l from CT+1. 
3.4.2.5. Bootstrapping as a validation strategy 
Bootstrapping is a well-known method that allows deriving an empirical distribution of estimates 
instead of a single estimate. This provides a way to assess how statistically likely are the 
observed results, given that margin of errors can be derived. The steps laid out in the previous 
two sections are repeated r times, hence obtaining r number of estimations the probability to 
move to a particular set of randomly chosen housing units, and hence r×l potential location 
outcomes for BP residents. In other words, we obtained r estimations of the fitted probability to 
choose a particular housing unit from the stock available CT+1. Since the fitted probabilities are 
the revealed utilities each household places in each housing unit l predicted to be chosen in each 
repetition r, we use this estimates as a way to asses the lower and upper most likely thresholds 
obtained from calculating the 95% confidence interval over the empirical distribution of 
estimated probabilities, assuming a 5% margin of error. These calculations allow to then 
obtaining the lower and upper bounds for the aforementioned adequacy measures of the 
predicted locations for BP residents. For example, with this method it is possible to know what 
would be the lowest and highest most likely distance-to-a-supermarket increase a household 
would face due to displacement. 
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3.5. Data 
Data on residential mobility was obtained from InfoUSA’s residential consumer dataset, which 
tracks residents’ addresses in Champaign County each quarter from 2013:q1 to 2014:q3 resulting 
in 7 consecutive time periods. Due to the availability of individual and household identification 
numbers, changes in residence can be identified by comparing quarter-over-quarter changes in 
each household’s address. Complimenting household level data on mobility are an additional 
series of demographic variables (e.g. gender, age, household head indicator, children count, 
estimated income levels, household purchasing power, and housing tenure), as well as occupancy 
characteristics of the current residence in each period (e.g. length of occupancy, dwelling type). 
Based upon residential addresses, we calculate distances to nearby amenities (parks, schools, 
etc.), important regional landmarks (downtown, The University of Illinois campus, etc.).  
 Additional data on housing unit characteristics was obtained from DataQuick22. This data 
contains addresses with Parcel Identification Numbers (PIN) of most of Champaign County 
dwellings. Available variables include square footage, number of rooms, sales dates and prices 
between 1997-2014, assessment values, together with other housing characteristics such as 
garage, fireplace, brick construction, etc. Missing values in these data were supplemented when 
possible with data from the Champaign County Assessors Office.  
Additional demographic neighborhood characteristics (rental vacancy rate, neighborhood 
racial and ethnic composition, housing tenure, adult education levels, median household income) 
where obtained from the 2009-2013 American Community Survey 5 year estimates.  
																																																								
22 Obtaining this data was possible due to the generous contribution of the Spatial Data Purchase Program of the 
Scholarly Commons Division of the University of Illinois Library.  
(http://www.library.illinois.edu/sc/datagis/purchase/description2014.html) 
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Finally, to get a more realistic idea of the housing opportunities that future displacees 
would be looking at when deciding where to move, address-level data from Zillow on units for 
rent and for sale was collected during the months of July and August 2015. 
 
3.6. Results and Forecasting 
3.6.1. Residential Mobility 
The Binomial Logit model proposed in equation 1 is here operationalized using several variables 
related to the mobility decision. Income, house type, age, length of residence and renting prices 
where variables included as they were shown to be important in the previous section to 
characterize residential mobility from life cycle conditions. To complement the way residential 
mobility is characterized, we also factor household characteristics (household size, the number of 
children per household, marital status, owner/renter score, female head indicator), and 
neighborhood and housing characteristics (distance to campus, median renting price and the 
percentage of African-American in the neighborhood) into this model.  
 Table 3.6 shows the results for the residential mobility model, where the dependent 
variable is equal to 1 or 0 if the household changed residence in each period of time. This model 
was estimated in each period of time tracking changes from one period to another to evaluate 
both the consistency of the estimated parameters as well as changes in their values across time.  
 Most variables used are consistent across time in the size and signs of their coefficients in 
predicting residential mobility with exception of a few variables that change signs when they are 
not statistically significant. In particular, Table 3.6 shows that the likelihood to move increases 
with household size, children present, average age in the household, marital status (i.e. married), 
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if a female head of the household; and decreases with higher values of length of residence, 
owning a property, and if the household lives in a single family dwelling.  
Neighborhood level variables suggest that the likelihood of moving will decrease 
together with higher renting prices, and higher distance to the university campus suggesting that 
the model captures rather well the dynamics of a city involved with a university community. 
Additionally, it is worth pointing out the positive and significant coefficient for the percentage of 
African Americans -- a first warning that the African American population could be facing 
higher risks of achieving housing stability, and an indication that displacement in a 
predominantly African American neighborhood like Bristol Place would only increase this trend. 
Additionally it is important to point out that the coefficient for this variable gets stronger and 
more significant in periods that are contrary to the typical moving periods of the university 
calendar. Hence the presence of African Americans seems to be a factor increasing the 
probabilities of residence changes in the quarters of Jan-March and April-June, and less in the 
other periods. 
Figure 3.3 shows the predicted probability to move from the models in Table 3.6 was 
estimated and plotted considering different groups of interest. Low-income residents (red line) 
are in general more prone to move than those with high income (blue line). Although this could 
be attributed to life cycle changes (i.e. low income households will move more at the beginning 
of their careers while they accumulate enough wealth to buy a dwelling), this could also reflect 
residential instability for low-income households. To shed light on this, we plot the average 
predicted probability for two particular neighborhoods. The solid lines in green and purple show 
the average probability of moving for the Census Tract (CT) containing Bristol Place and a 
Campus Area CT respectively. These lines suggest that the Campus Area CT has a higher 
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likelihood to change residence than BP neighborhood. However, when plotting the average for 
the same CTs but only for the low-income groups using the same colors but dotted lines, low-
income BP residents have higher likelihoods to move than their non-low-income counterparts, 
which is not the case for the Campus Area CT. Although the solid lines’ pattern is expected from 
the changing nature of a campus area, the dotted lines’ pattern that shows a reduction distance of 
the two CTs is unexpected because it suggests that low-income residents in BP could be 
competing for the same housing opportunities as the campus population – an indication that BP 
residents would potentially face the risk of a more competitive housing market. 
3.6.2. Location Choice 
Location choice models presented in Table 3.7 show the estimated coefficients for the variables 
predicting the choice between housing unit alternatives. As mentioned in Section 4, a 
multinomial logit (MNL) model was used to estimate a model in each period of time. Following 
Waddell (2003, 2013) random sampling of alternatives was implemented. Here alternative l1 was 
the chosen alternative observed from the data set, and then additional 9 other alternatives (l2 … 
l10) where randomly sampled from the choice set C of available alternatives.  
Most of the estimated coefficients are again significant and have the expected signs 
suggesting that the models are a fairly good representation of location choice theories. 
Neighborhood features including house prices, distance to the university campus and downtown 
area, as well as the median number of bedrooms have positive estimated impacts on the choices. 
The percentage of African Americans in the neighborhood as well as the distance to the 
downtown area have a negative impact on the likelihood of selecting a particular housing unit, 
although this last variable is not significant when it shows a negative sign.  
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Finally, the first interaction term capturing the effect of household size with the average 
household size in the neighborhood is consistently positive and significant capturing a 
concentration pattern of housing stock by size, implying clustering of family households. The 
second interaction term reflecting age fit between the household and its neighborhood was 
estimated to be negative suggesting that households prefer more diverse neighborhoods in terms 
of their age structure – somewhat counter-intuitive as we expected that households would prefer 
living in neighborhoods with similar age structures. However, the fact that the city is embedded 
in a university town could be the reason of the sign of this coefficient due to the high presence of 
younger populations.  
3.6.3. Forecasting  
After the MNL models were estimated based on the mobility data prior observing displacement, 
the last model (T=2014.q3) was used as the base to predict the location choices of future 
displacees. The main assumption here is that the estimated coefficients from the MNL models 
are a good proxy to predict how households facing displacement will choose a dwelling. Hence 
the estimated coefficients are the first part needed to be able to do the forecast. The second piece 
of information is household characteristics of future displacees, which have been provided by 
canvasing the households and obtaining their information from the datasets available described 
in Section 5. The third and final data requirement is the housing stock C available in T+1 from 
where potential displacees would choose a new dwelling.  
As mentioned in Section 3.5, this data was obtained from Zillow listings of houses and 
apartments offered in the area between July-August 2015. From subset CT+1 a random sample of 
10 alternatives was drawn, where now all l1 to l10 are random alternatives since l1 is not observed. 
Once having all three pieces of information, the characteristics of the potential displacees were 
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multiplied by the set of estimated coefficients obtaining the utility of each household for each the 
potential alternatives as well as the corresponding likelihood that they will choose that particular 
dwelling over the other alternatives. From the 10 alternatives estimated for each household, a 
similar criterion used in Waddell (2010) was used as the market clearing process. In particular, if 
the number of available dwellings was higher than the number demanding households, a first-
come-first-served algorithm was implemented to assign households to the dwelling with the 
highest estimated probability of choice. 
 As mentioned in the methodology section, we used a bootstrap with 500 repetitions of the 
forecasting process to derive the empirical distribution of fitted probabilities. Given the great 
number of estimated fitted probabilities to move for each Bristol Place household, three 
measures were used to summarize the empirical distribution: Maximum Probability (MP), Most 
Frequent (MF) and the Median (P50). The (MP) measure is calculated as the housing choice with 
the highest probability to move from all 500 choices; the MF is calculated as the housing choice 
that is most frequently chosen; and the P50 is the housing choice that is in the median of the 
empirical distribution.  
 Figures 3.4-3.7 show the current location and the estimated dwelling choices for the MP, 
MF and P50 measures respectively. These predictions allow comparing previous and posterior 
situations of those households to be displaced, which were not possible without this type of 
predicting capabilities. In particular, Figure 3.7 shows that BP residents will be spatially 
concentrated in specific areas of the city regardless of the metric used to characterize the 
potential future situation. The area west of downtown Champaign shows the highest predicted 
concentration of relocatees – this area has a mix of single-family houses and older multifamily 
dwellings mostly inhabited by students and lower-income groups.  
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 Table 3.8 shows a comparison before and after displacement of neighborhood and 
household level variables relative to the built-environment. Besides comparing the current 
situation with the three measures previously described (MP, MF, P50), the lower (P 2.5) and 
upper (P 97.5) bounds represent the confidence intervals for the presented predictions. Most of 
these estimates are significantly different within a 95% confidence interval from the current 
situation of Bristol Place residents. This can be seen by noting that the values on the predicted 
columns of Table 3.8 fall within the confidence interval, but the values on the current column do 
not. Additionally, Figure 3.8 illustrates the aforementioned results, where it can be appreciated 
the full extent of the empirical distribution of potential outcomes. 
At the neighborhood level, the predicted location of households suggests that on average, 
BP residents will potentially live in neighborhoods with: higher work commute times, lower 
concentration of African Americans, higher proportion of multifamily residences, more affluent 
families in terms of their income, higher rental prices, and smaller household sizes implying 
smaller units or less square feet per person. With the exception of a reduction in racial 
segregation, all other results have the potential to be detrimental to BP residents. In particular, 
higher renting prices and higher income levels may respectively reduce household disposable 
income and expose residents to more costly commodity prices in higher income neighborhoods. 
These results are particularly indicative of the potential danger that BP residents will face of 
falling in even lower income levels and poverty. 
At the household level, BP residents are predicted to live on average farther way from 
amenities such as the university campus, downtown Champaign, the regional shopping mall, 
health facilities, and public parks; but closer in average to educational facilities such including 
both elementary schools and high schools. Although we do not have sufficient information to 
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connect these amenities to current use and employment scenarios for residents, an increased 
distance to these amenities reflects a potential hardship for BP residents to access services and 
job opportunities.  
 
3.7. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this paper was to provide a method to lower the research gap in ex ante 
analysis of housing displacement; and provide a method to help plan for more holistic solutions 
when urban renewal leads to displacement. These two goals were addressed by relying on the 
literature of residential mobility and location choice modeling, in which housing displacement 
was seen as a particular case where households did not determine the decision between moving 
and staying. Hence, the final research objective of this paper was to predict what would be the 
most likely location choice (dwelling) of future displacees.  
We inform discrete choice models with baseline data for other households who have 
moved, and then use this to predict likely spatial outcomes for our population of interest. 
Confirming initial expectations from theories of housing careers and life cycles, households with 
higher residential mobility rates are on average younger, have lower-income levels, live in multi-
family dwellings, have lower lengths of residence prior their move, and when they do they move 
within lower priced neighborhoods. Additionally, and although there seems that the majority of 
households stay in their neighborhoods and socio-economic settings implying neighborhood 
stability, there are cases where households go against the expected trends of social climbing, life 
cycles and housing careers. 
When exploring more in detail residential mobility by using a binomial logit model, the 
main findings indicate that BP residents have in general lower likelihood to change residence 
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compared to another neighborhoods. However, when contrasting the case between the predicted 
probabilities among low-income residents in those neighborhoods, BP residents with low-income 
have higher likelihoods to move than the non-low-income counterparts, which is not the case for 
the other neighborhood. It was said that a potential implication of this is that BP residents would 
potentially face a more competitive housing market, which could in turn put them in danger of 
falling further into more precarious situations due to their low-income characteristic alone. 
Finally, the most important results comes from forecasting of the location choice of BP 
residents, because it allows to calculate measures of neighborhood and household level variables 
relative to the built-environment that future displacees currently have and will potentially face. 
At the neighborhood level it was important to emphasize that with exception of a reduction of 
racial segregation, all other results are detrimental to the current living conditions that BP 
residents have. In particular, higher renting prices and higher income levels will be a twofold 
detrimental effect on residents’ economy since the former will reduce their disposable income 
and the latter will be affected for the higher priced food stores available in the higher income 
neighborhoods. At the household level, BP residents are predicted to be worse off in terms of the 
distance to the amenities and urban landmarks. Although at this time there is no data available on 
their work locations, these distance to amenities could be considered as a proxy that suggests a 
potential hardship of BP residents to access services and job opportunities. 
As one of the few papers to undertake this approach, this paper is certainly in debt of an 
analysis that could serve as a robustness check of the results of the proposed model. Additional 
work is also needed in improving the market clearing process and the sampling of alternatives 
methodologies recently proposed in the literature. Finally, and although we recognize is an 
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important dimension, an analysis on the social networks of BP residents have been also left out 
of this analysis mainly due to the lack of data.  
 100 
3.8. FIGURES 
 
Figure. 3.1. Location of the Bristol Place Neighborhood in Champaign, IL 
 
 
 
Figure. 3.2. Assumed choice structure 
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Figure 3.3. Distribution of the Predicted Probability to Move across different groups 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Current vs. Predicted Locations of Bristol Place Residents  
Maximum Probability (MP) 
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Figure 3.5. Current vs. Predicted Locations of Bristol Place Residents  
Most Frequent Choice (MF) 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Current vs. Predicted Locations of Bristol Place Residents  
Median Choice (P50) 
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Figure 3.7. Current vs. Predicted Locations of Bristol Place Residents 
Spatial Density of the 500 Bootstrap Repetitions 
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Figure 3.8. Before and After (MF) comparison of selected variables of adequacy 
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3.9. TABLES 
Table 3.1. Demographic comparison between Bristol Place and the rest of Champaign-Urbana  
Variable Bristol Place Champaign-Urbana 
Mean Household Income $35,807 $59,515 
Percentage of Single-Family Residences 0.60 0.50 
Percentage of Multi-Family Residences 0.40 0.50 
Median Number of Rooms 4.80 5.07 
Percentage of Owners 0.46 0.45 
Percentage of Renters 0.54 0.55 
Average Household Size (Owners) 2.53 2.04 
Average Household Size (Renters) 2.41 2.14 
Median Owner House Price $63,700 $139,032 
Median Renting Price $691 $849 
Average Age Inhabitants 29.30 32.81 
Percentage of Male 0.54 0.50 
Percentage of African-American 0.32 0.16 
Percentage of White 0.56 0.70 
Percentage of Latino 0.26 0.05 
Average Travel to work time (min) 13.7 15.4 
    Source:  2009-2013 American Community Survey 5 year estimates. 
    Note: Mean values at the Census Tract level. 
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Table 3.2: Comparison between Ex Ante and Ex Post studies  
 Ex Ante Ex Post 
Main Purpose 
Generate a prediction of potential 
outcomes of a program 
implementation to minimize cost of 
implementation and potential 
unintended consequences 
Evaluate the intended versus real 
outcomes of a program 
implementation. 
Advantages 
• Deliver deeper analysis by 
including a greater number of 
variables 
• Provides a way to design optimal 
outcome programs either by 
minimizing costs or maximizing 
impacts at a given costs. 
• Can help agencies avoid wasting 
resources on programs that are 
poorly designed  
• Can often provide a range of 
expected outcomes that can help 
decide the feasibility of programs 
• Even when there could be a 
program in place, ex ante 
evaluations can help predict how 
impacts would change depending 
of changes in the program 
implementation  
• Provides accurate measures that 
allow evaluating the real outcomes 
of a program 
• Help correcting future program 
implementations 
• Easy to validate in terms of 
research design 
• Requires less data and time is 
irrelevant since the program has 
already been implemented 
Disadvantages 
• Provides accurate measures within 
a margin of error 
• Require time, data and political 
willingness to be carried out 
• Requires thoughtful research 
design to validate results 
• Restricted to be carried out after the 
program has been implemented 
• Analysis is often restricted to the 
variables measured before and after 
• Cannot help planning for less 
unintended consequences 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Length of Residence in Current Residence (Bristol Place) 
Length of 
Residence 
Renters Owners Total 
N % N % N % 
Less than 1 year 8 29% 1 7% 9 21% 
1-2 years 5 18% 0 0% 5 12% 
2-5 years 9 32% 0 0% 9 21% 
5-10 years 4 14% 4 27% 8 19% 
> 10 years 2 7% 10 67% 12 28% 
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100% 
  Source:  Greenlee & Tutt (2012) 
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Table 3.4: Desire to Return to a Redeveloped Neighborhood (Bristol Place) 
Desire to 
Return 
Renters Owners Total 
N % N % N % 
Yes 16 57% 7 47% 23 53% 
No 5 18% 5 33% 10 23% 
Maybe 4 14% 1 7% 5 12% 
No Response 3 11% 2 13% 5 12% 
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100% 
  Source:  Greenlee & Tutt (2012) 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: Desire to Return by Returning Tenure 
Desired 
Tenure 
Renters Owners Total 
N % N % N % 
Renter 9 32% 0 0 9 21% 
Homeowner 9 32% 6 40% 15 35% 
Both 4 14% 0 0 4 9% 
No Response 6 21% 9 60% 15 35% 
Total 28 100% 15 100% 43 100% 
  Source:  Greenlee & Tutt (2012) 
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Table 3.6. Residential Mobility Binomial Logit Models 
 
Dependent variable: Move=1 
Base period 2013:q1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  2013:q2 2013:q3 2013:q4 2014:q1 2014:q2 2014:q3 
Household Size 0.106 0.008 0.024 0.045 0.064 0.090** 
(0.085) (0.050) (0.047) (0.058) (0.055) (0.043) 
Children per 
Household 
0.312*** 0.146*** 0.132*** 0.124** 0.043 0.107** 
(0.079) (0.051) (0.050) (0.062) (0.065) (0.053) 
Average Age in 
Household 
0.016*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Marital Status 
Score 
0.164*** 0.181*** 0.157*** 0.112*** 0.147*** 0.129*** 
(0.044) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028) (0.022) 
Female Head = 1 0.365*** 0.500*** 0.523*** 0.549*** 0.506*** 0.337*** 
(0.131) (0.069) (0.065) (0.085) (0.086) (0.066) 
Owner/Renter 
Score 
0.045 -0.014 -0.017 0.023 -0.041** -0.041*** 
(0.029) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) 
Length of 
Residence 
-0.577*** -0.718*** -0.597*** -0.356*** -0.358*** -0.697*** 
(0.036) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) 
Income (thousands) -0.005*** 0.001 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.003*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Home Price 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
% African 
American 
0.894*** 0.300* 0.169 0.798*** 0.806*** 0.264 
(0.305) (0.172) (0.168) (0.208) (0.208) (0.165) 
Distance to 
Campus 
0.068 -0.135*** -0.169*** -0.063* 0.053 -0.075*** 
(0.050) (0.026) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) 
Single Family = 1 -0.158 -0.014 -0.147* -0.500*** -0.120 -0.103 
(0.150) (0.088) (0.085) (0.111) (0.115) (0.083) 
Median Renting 
Price 
-0.0001 -0.00003 -0.0001 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004** 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant -5.062*** -2.807*** -2.498*** -3.192*** -3.214*** -2.126*** 
(0.288) (0.151) (0.144) (0.190) (0.189) (0.145) 
Observations 110,980 108,257 106,459 105,480 107,332 109,263 
Log Likelihood -2,799.636 -7,999.113 -8,676.592 -5,668.779 -5,676.678 -8,464.546 
Note:  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 3.7. Location Choice Multinomial Logit Models 
 
Dependent variable: Move=1 
 
Base period 2013:q1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  2013:q2 2013:q3 2013:q4 2014:q1 2014:q2 2014:q3 
Estimated House Price 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Distance to Campus 0.446*** 0.086 0.382*** 0.209** 0.275*** 0.027 
(0.099) (0.057) (0.082) (0.104) (0.086) (0.060) 
Distance to Downtown 
Urbana 
-0.106 0.048 -0.035 0.156** 0.064 0.118*** 
(0.070) (0.042) (0.059) (0.073) (0.059) (0.043) 
% African American -0.820** -0.928*** -1.527*** -0.755* -1.044*** -0.689*** 
(0.359) (0.221) (0.337) (0.416) (0.348) (0.218) 
Median Number o 
Rooms 
0.129* -0.016 -0.099 -0.161** -0.103* -0.056 
(0.073) (0.037) (0.061) (0.080) (0.057) (0.037) 
Average Household 
Size X Household Size 
0.084*** 0.038* 0.081*** 0.062* 0.059** 0.026 
(0.029) (0.020) (0.023) (0.032) (0.023) (0.019) 
Average Age X 
Average Age in 
Household) 
-0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
(0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00001) 
Observations 507 1,462 702 475 702 1,455 
Log Likelihood -1,116.126 -3,337.820 -1,567.966 -1,052.702 -1,559.991 -3,312.273 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 3.8. Comparison of Bristol Place Residents Built-Environment Variables before and after displacement 
  Current Predicted  95% CI 
Variable  
Bristol 
Place 
Maximum  
(MP) 
Most Frequent    
(MF) 
Median 
(P50) 
Lower  
(P 2.5) 
Upper 
 (P 97.5) 
Neighborhood Level             
  
Mean Travel Time to Work 13.7 15.853 15.442 14.778 13.792 15.517 
Perc. African American 0.32 0.116 0.113 0.125 0.104 0.136 
Per. Multifamily 0.396 0.362 0.56 0.574 0.472 0.58 
Median Household Income 35,807 78,038.02 60,980.58 52,140.06 49,599.81 64,843.31 
Perc. Renters 0.541 0.405 0.587 0.624 0.518 0.649 
Median Renting Price 691 804.109 766.328 805.531 805.391 834.578 
Median Number of Rooms 4.8 5.82 4.777 4.525 4.609 5.147 
Average Household Size 2.41 2.105 1.81 1.896 2.006 2.023 
Household Level             
  
Dist. to Campus-town 1.71 2.94 2.259 2.067 1.7 2.697 
Dist. to Downtown Ch. 0.85 2.328 1.433 1.651 1.33 1.913 
Dist. to Market Place 0.96 3.266 2.513 2.442 1.493 4.630 
Dist. to Health Centers 0.47 0.747 0.633 0.644 0.619 0.783 
Dist. to Parks 0.107 0.361 0.248 0.247 0.231 0.278 
Dist. to Educational Fac. 0.515 0.458 0.339 0.345 0.297 0.394 
Dist. to Previous Residence 0 2.9 2.041 2.105 1.925 2.443 
Renting Price Pred. Choice 0 673.968 785.869 780.984 646.29 876.047 
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3.11. Annex: Exploratory Analysis 
Initial descriptive work was done in order to check if regularities in life cycles and 
housing careers as suggested in Clark & Dieleman (1996).  Figure 3.9 shows a tabulation 
of the number of movers per income brackets and age cohorts, showing that most movers 
are young households with lower income levels. Considering only income and age, 
residential mobility decreases as these two variables increase. We also observe a jump on 
the number of movers in the $60K-$90K income bracket, which most likely reflects 
households starting their careers in the job market, and that change in residence could 
reflect their increase in income from their first job. 
Figure 3.9. Number of Movers per Age and Income Group  (3) 
 
Similarly, Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the number of movers by income levels, 
contrasting them with house type and length of residence. As expected, lower income 
movers are more likely to select into multi-family dwellings and have shorter lengths of 
residence prior their move. However, this tendency changes with life cycle and housing 
careers because as a household increases its income, movers switch preferences towards 
single-family dwellings and have longer lengths of residence, which is in general a 
consequence of changes in housing career, including family creation and job stability. 
Under 20K 20K ~ 40K 40K ~ 60K 60K ~ 90K 90K ~ 125K 125K ~ 200K 200K ~ 300K 300K ~ UP
18−24
25−29
30−34
35−39
40−44
45−49
50−54
55−59
60−64
65 +
65−69
70−74
75 +
Number of Movers per Age and Income Group
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
2013q1 − 2014q1 
 115 
Figure 3.10. Number of Movers per House Type and Income Group  (4) (5) 
A: Multi Family; H: Single Family 
 
 
Figure 3.11. Number of Movers per Income Group and Length of Residence in months 
 
Tracking residential changes within and between neighborhoods helps us to understand 
how stable neighborhoods are within a city. Figure 3.12.a shows the proportion of moves 
across neighborhoods stratified by price range. Neighborhoods with a higher proportion 
of lower-priced units experience higher within-neighborhood mobility rates, while 
neighborhoods with higher overall price points see more inter-neighborhood mobility 
(Figure 3.13.a). This fits with lifecycle explanations of housing choice: as household 
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income increases, they are more willing to look for housing in other neighborhoods that 
would offer a better fit for their new housing necessities.23  
Figure 3.12.a. Movers Between and Within Neighborhoods Based on Price Ranges 
 
 
Figure 3.13.a. Movers Between and Within Neighborhoods Based on Price Ranges 
 																																																								23	Although we could have used neighborhood names instead of their price ranges for 
categorization, is more useful to use the latter because it provides a dimension of analysis 
that is familiar to anyone.	
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This mobility map24 shows two types of flows: those within each neighborhood price 
bracket, where households that remain in the same neighborhood are represented with a 
line that starts and ends in the same bracket, and movements between neighborhoods with 
a line that starts in one neighborhood price bracket and ends in another. Line widths 
represent the number of households moving. This figure shows two expected patterns in 
concordance with life cycles: neighborhood resilience (i.e. most neighborhoods have a 
stable amount of residents that prefer staying), and upward movements (i.e. moves 
between neighborhood brackets that go from low to higher price neighborhoods). 
However, it is surprising to see that there are also cases of downward movements that 
were difficult to see in Figure 3.12.a (i.e. moves from higher price neighborhoods to 
lower ones). This finding goes against life cycle expectations and can be related with loss 
of income or job stability. 
 
Finally, figures 3.12.b and 3.13.b focus on flows of residents between income brackets. 
As income increases, moves to higher income levels are more frequent. We do note a 
non-dismissible group of households that go from the very bottom income bracket (0-
20K in red) to higher brackets and even to the top ones (represented in Figure 3.13.b with 
red-slim lines). Also and contrary to social climbing expectations, a number of 
households go down from higher brackets to lower ones. Because these changes in 
income levels have been recorded from changes in residences, it could be argued that part 
of them could be also related to residential mobility although no causal mechanisms are 
clear at this point. However it is important to highlight that this is a potential risk from 
housing displacement as housing instability could lead to the loss of jobs and income. 																																																								
24 Adapted from the original work of Abel, G. J., & Sander, N. (2014) on international migration 
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Figure 3.12.b. Movers Between and Within Income Groups 
 
 
Figure 3.13.b. Movers Between and Within Income Groups 
 
 
Summarizing, we find that households that move more are in general younger, 
have shorter lengths of residence, live in multi-family units, move within neighborhoods 
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with lower prices if they have lower income, and between neighborhoods as their income 
increase. Additionally, and although there seems that the majority of households stay in 
their neighborhoods and socio-economic settings implying neighborhood stability, there 
are cases where households go against the expected trends of social climbing, life cycles 
and housing careers. 
 
 
